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 ABSTRACT 
 
Agricultural insurance is rapidly becoming one of the most important policy 
initiatives in Chinese agriculture. While numerous studies have examined crop 
insurance in China, several important aspects of the problem remain elusive. One of 
these is the determination of the demand for agricultural insurance and the willingness 
to pay (WTP) for coverage relative to risk, amongst other important attributes. The 
current pricing structure in China is relatively homogenous, with farmers paying a 
similar rate regardless of local conditions. Under these conditions, determining a ‘true’ 
demand response to different premium structures is difficult because there is 
insufficient exogenous variation in premiums from which to judge.  To overcome this 
problem, I conducted in-the-field discrete choice experiments involving 417 farmers 
across 5 Chinese provinces in 2018. 
Overall, farmers prefer a crop insurance with lower premium, higher 
indemnity, issued by a state-owned insurance company and is acceptable as a loan 
collateral when given a higher frequency of disaster. In addition, it was found that 
education, years of farming, connection with government, economic situation and 
knowledge on crop insurance affect farmers’ ranking and willingness to pay for the 
above attributes. Since the research focuses on both overall demand and regional 
differences, the findings help to better design the insurance products in order to meet 
the actual demand of the farmers in that particular area and provide benefits to both 
farmers and insurance companies. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Agricultural insurance as one of the agricultural policies allowed by the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), provides a safety net for the revenue in the agricultural 
sector. It is continuously of interest to the Chinese government because of many of its 
traits: alleviating poverty, stabilizing rural economy and ensuring food materials for 
the nation. Since China acceded to the WTO in 2001, it has made a great contribution 
to global poverty reduction. According to the newest released "China and the World 
Trade Organization" white paper by China’s State Council Information Office (SCIO, 
2018), over the past 40 years of reform and opening-up, more than 700 million 
Chinese people have been lifted out of poverty under the current UN standards. This 
number accounts for more than 70% of the world over the same period, which makes 
the largest contribution to poverty reduction in the world.  
China’s agricultural sector is continually facing limitations. China makes up 
more than one-fifth of the world’s population and the population is growing quickly, 
while it only holds 10% of the arable land (OECD, 2005). Though the concerns are 
relieved by modern technology innovation, weather and other risks to agricultural 
production still exist, for instance, drought, floods, fire, diseases and other natural 
disasters which can be exacerbated by global warming. Moreover, market risk like the 
price fluctuation affects the stabilization of rural economy and people’s everyday life. 
Therefore, the importance of risk management in agriculture is noticeable. In the 
United States, government assists agricultural sector to manage agricultural risk, 
concentrating on ad hoc disaster relief (disaster payments and emergency loans) and 
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loss assistance (agricultural insurance) (USDA, 2018). However, the system of risk 
management in China is not as comprehensive as that of the United States. Besides 
agricultural insurance, direct financial support is the major method adopted by the 
Chinese government. When a disaster occurs, the Ministry of Finance of the People’s 
Republic of China directly funds the farmers for their loss. Though the government 
works efficiently, sending out the subsidies right after the disaster happens, the post-
disaster subsidies are more temporary compared with agricultural insurance which is 
more planned (Song, 2011). The explicit requirements of agricultural insurance are 
shown as they have been set as an important component in the No. 1 Central 
Document, which is issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China and the State Council. Since 2007, agricultural insurance has been continuously 
written in the No. 1 Central Document. In the first policy document of 2018 (Kim, 
2018), it focused on the issue of rural vitalization strategy. It pointed out that to 
improve the agricultural supporting and protecting system, the government will 
regulate the compensation mechanism for the interests of major grain-producing areas. 
Pilot projects of full cost insurance and income insurance for rice, wheat and maize 
will be employed. And accelerating the establishment of a multi-level agricultural 
insurance system will be the main focus. 
Given the fact above and the current political environment, it can be seen that 
more varieties of agricultural insurance will be created in the near future. It is 
desirable that the participation rates of agricultural insurance products are sufficiently 
high, in that the products stabilize farmers' incomes in the long run and ensure a stable 
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supply in food industry. Woodard & Yi (2018) developed a formula of the optimal 
deductible demand which is the first-order condition (FOC) of utility. 
c = 	− (& + ()	*(+) − ((& + ()*,(+) = 1*,(+)	[ (& + ( − *(+)] 
where c ∈ [0,1] is the coverage level which is 1 minus the deductible percent, *(+) is 
premium rate conditional on the coverage level, *,(+) is the FOC of *(+), & and ( are 
the limited expected values of marginal utility under insurance over the range of the 
probability distribution for outcomes above and below the insured liability.  
They pointed out that the deductible demand is determined by the producer’s 
utility function through & and (, the distribution of underlying of the interest being 
insured (e.g., revenue) which is embedded in &, the level of premium rate and its 
slope. The other finding was that the optimal demand would decrease if increasing the 
FOC of the premium rate. 
 Michaels, A, et al. (2017) studied the susidy design of insurance premium, 
indicating that if the marginal cost becomes the effective supply, the area between the 
marginal cost and actuarial cost would be the zone of subsidy (Figure 1), which 
encourages higher uptake and higher levels of coverage. 
The conceptual frameworks denote that farmers’ demand for agricultural 
insurance depends on premium and premium subsidies. Therefore, to develop a 
sustainable rural economy, the most important question is how to design an 
agricultural insurance that actually meets the demands for the current agricultural 
sector while taking these factors into account.  
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Figure 1. Insurance supply and demand 
 
1.1 Economic problem  
Since the agricultural insurance industry is not a competitive market in China, 
it is difficult to study the demand for agricultural insurance. The economic problem is 
what are the factors affecting crop insurance purchases by farmers in contemporary 
China? It is desirable to understand how Chinese farmers weight various attributes of 
crop insurance demand to determine whether they follow the traditional demand 
model and indicate farmers’ preferences and willingness to pay (WTP) for insurance. 
Consequently, this research develops a multi-attribute discrete choice model and 
assesses the willingness to pay for these attributes and to compare and contrast WTP 
across five Chinese provinces (Shandong, Sichuan, Shaanxi, Jiangsu and Henan). 
1.2 Research problem 
In previous years, the handicap of the Chinese agricultural insurance industry 
was the lack of data analysis, so that there was an economic loss for both farmers and 
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insurance companies. Besides that, since farmers in a particular village receive the 
same premium rate, there was not much variability in current data. In the absence of 
widespread variation in insurance rates it is difficult to determine the true insurance 
demand curve and relative elasticity of demand relative to premiums, coverage and 
risk. Experimental methods can introduce certain forms of exogenous variation into 
field-surveys to address this problem. Therefore, a choice experiment will be adopted 
to provide variation in farmers’ preference in that this method allows for preference 
variation. Moreover, WTP measures from in-the-field choice experiments can be 
translated into practical implications and policy guidelines for both the government 
and insurance companies. 
1.3 Objectives 
The overall objective of this thesis is to investigate farmers’ willingness to pay 
for certain attributes of crop insurance in China. Using the choice experiment method 
and testing results under conditional and mixed logit models as the vehicles to 
achieving this objective, the specific goals of the study are to 
a. Analyze the attributes that affect farmers’ preference towards crop insurance 
purchase and compare the results between different regions. 
b. Calculate the willingness to pay for all attributes and compare the results 
between different regions. 
c. Provide insights into factors affecting the demand for insurance, and from 
this discuss policy options for crop insurance. 
The outline of the thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2, the background of 
agricultural insurance in China is discussed, including its development and current 
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mechanism. Besides, preliminary studies in both western and Chinese literature on 
agricultural insurance are discussed at the end of the chapter. Chapter 3 focuses on the 
methodology and its related literature. Moreover, the econometrics of both conditional 
and mixed logit model are presented, along with the properties and the comparison 
between the two models. In Chapter 4, designs of the two rounds of choice experiment 
are provided, including the explanation of D-optimal design, variable selection and 
description, and expected results. The design of survey, as the other part of both 
rounds, and the descriptive results from the survey are presented as well. In addition, 
the how the two rounds of experiments were carried out is described in this chapter. In 
Chapter 5, the empirical results from both conditional and mixed logit regressions 
logit with respect to both experiments are presented. For the choice experiment results 
in each round, the overall result is presented first, followed by the results from 
individual province. At the end of each round, WTP with respect to each attribute in 
separate province and the overall situation are illustrated along with the interpretation. 
Chapter 6 as the last chapter, includes the future work and the conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND 
This chapter discusses the definition of agricultural insurance and its 
development in China. It also explains the current mechanism of crop insurance in 
China, for instance how agricultural insurance works, the governmental subsidy, the 
premium rate and indemnity. At the end of the chapter, preliminary studies in both 
western and Chinese literature on agricultural insurance are discussed. 
2.1 What is agricultural insurance 
Agricultural insurance is the “insurance applied to crops, livestock, 
aquaculture, and forestry” according to the definition from the World Bank (2010). A 
survey from Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO, 1991) in 
1991 suggested that agricultural insurance has been used for a variety of purposes and 
in various forms in more than 70 countries. Traditionally, farmers deal with disasters 
through selling part of their assets for instance livestock, using on-farm stocks and 
family savings, and/or moving working places to send money back home. However, 
Hazell et al. (1986) pointed out that the effectiveness of these methods highly depends 
on the covariance between agricultural and nonfarm income within and across regions. 
With the existence of agricultural insurance, this risk-preventing method provides 
stability of farmers’ income which can be broadly extended to the rural economy. 
FAO [1] lists the types of businesses including crop insurance, livestock insurance, 
aquacultural insurance and forestry. It also points out that building and equipment 
insurance are often excluded. Among various agricultural insurance products, crop 
insurance is the main focus in this research and FAO defines it as an agricultural 
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insurance which provides protection against loss or damage to growing crops for 
instance, hail, windstorm, fire and flood. The measurement of loss could be based on 
yield, production costs, agreed value or rehabilitation costs. Crop-revenue insurance is 
also a popular variety. And the crop insurance also can be geared towards the loss of 
productive asset such as tree crops. In this paper, crop insurance is explained as a 
financial product that farmers pay the premium to an insurance company, then if there 
was a disaster that generating damage ratio, for example, affecting 70% of the crop 
production compared with the average yield in normal years, farmers need to inform 
the insurance company and the insurance company will compensate farmers based on 
its calculation. How exactly current insurance works will be elaborated in the 
following context. 
2.2 History of agricultural insurance development in China 
As a country facing a large variety of destructive natural disasters in the world, 
China has experienced a few billion losses (yuan) in the agricultural sector (Wang, 
2011). To ensure the stability of rural economy and national food security, 
establishing an agricultural insurance system is the promising solution. In general, the 
development of agricultural insurance can be classified into three stages: the stop-
begin circle stage of 1949-1982, the market decreasing stage of 1982-2003, and the 
government intervention-exploration and development stage since 2004 (Bao, 2010). 
Wang et al. (2011) in their paper of the History of Agricultural Insurance in 
China provided solid information for the three stages. In terms of the first stage, 
agricultural insurance as one of the insurance products that have a long history, was 
first operated by the People’s Insurance Company of China (PICC) when the nation 
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was founded in 1949. Beginning in 1950, agricultural insurance in livestock and 
cotton was ran in selected counties and districts. Then in 1951 the livestock insurance 
program extended to the nation and the whole cotton production area were covered by 
cotton insurance. Moreover, several selected regions tried out rice and cole insurance. 
However, under the policy of downsizing institutions, the unurgent agricultural 
insurance programs were suspended. PICC reemphasized the agricultural insurance in 
1954 but it did not last long. All the early programs were abandoned after four years as 
the People’s Commune system was established. Though the first several trials did not 
stand long, farmers were getting to be familiar with agricultural insurance. 
A new round of agricultural insurance pilot project in China dates from 1982, 
which was the beginning of the second stage. It was developed from Opinion and 
Suggestion on the Recovery Situation of Domestic Insurance Business and Future 
Development released by the People’s Bank of China and operated by PICC. This 
report was approved by the State Council and since then a gradual introduction of 
rural property and livestock insurance occurred. In the beginning of the second stage, 
in order to increase the adoption rate, government provided huge subsidies to 
agricultural insurance companies, for instance waving business tax. As the result, the 
collected premium climbed fast and the influence diffused largely, which is called the 
Golden development stage. By 1993, positive feedback on both the variety of 
agricultural insurance and the coverage of regions were received. Most villages in 29 
out of 34 provinces in China were covered by agricultural insurance. However, year 
1993 was a turning point of the second stage. After 1993, due to the 
commercialization of PICC and the insignificant growth in the agricultural sector, the 
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annual collected premiums significantly decreased in 1994 and experienced 
fluctuation in the following years (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2.Profile of agriculture insurance for the PICC from 1982 to 2006 
Source: Editorial Committee of Yearbooks of China’s Insurance 2002–2010; Editorial 
Committee of Yearbooks of China’s Economy 1991–2001; Guo et al. 2007 
 
In 1986, the Production and Construction Corps of Xinjiang founded the 
Agriculture Insurance Company of Xinjiang Corps (now is named as the China United 
Property Insurance Company), which solely provided agricultural insurance in 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Since the company adopted the combination of 
low premium rate and moderate reimbursement, it gradually occupied a significant 
share of the market (Figure 3). In 2002, China United Property Insurance Company 
(China United) expanded the range of its products to all property types and was given 
the authorization to operate the business in the nation. Though the annual collected 
premiums steadily rose for China United, overall the insurance companies in China 
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were facing the burden of indemnity payouts due to natural disasters during 1982-
2003 period. The loss ratio (total payments / total collected premiums) in 2003 
reached 92.1% which is significantly higher than the normal loss ratio at 70% (Fei & 
Zhang, 2004). Besides, the lack of strong drivers in agricultural economy, which 
further suppressed the business growth of the agricultural companies. 
 
Figure 3. Profile of agriculture insurance for the China United from 1987 to 2006 
Source: Editorial Committee of Yearbooks of China’s Insurance 2002–2010; Editorial 
Committee of Yearbooks of China’s Economy 1991–2001; Guo et al. 2007. 
 
The Chinese central government realized that the current agricultural insurance 
products did not meet the needs of the farmers and the development of the rural 
economy. After rethinking the previous operation mode and combining the western 
experience and Chinese situation, the agricultural insurance business transited from 
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commercialized to policy-oriented (Li & Zhao, 2015). The governmental intervention 
on agricultural insurance market introduced the third stage. In 2004, China Insurance 
Regulatory Commission (CIRC) launched policy-oriented agricultural insurance trials 
in 9 selected provinces. Later, the government started to emphasize the importance of 
agricultural insurance and included it in the No. 1 Central Document. In 2007, the 
Ministry of Finance funded 1 billion yuan to subsidize agricultural insurance premium 
to another 6 provinces. Sichuan and Inner Mongolia were two provinces selected to 
evaluate the performance of premium subsidization in 2011. Two more provinces 
were chosen to be evaluated in the following year. In 2013, a total of 10 provinces 
were included to report the performance of premium subsidization which indicated the 
system of premium subsidization was officially formed (Li & Zhao, 2015). 
For continually valuing agricultural insurance, the statistics released by the 
CIRC (2018) indicated that in 2017, agricultural insurance provided the risk 
management to 213 million farmers. The annual collected premiums achieved 47.906 
billion RMB, yielding 14.69% year-on-year growth and annual indemnity payout was 
33.449 billion RMB, obtaining 11.79% year-on-year growth. Compared with 5.18 
billion RMB in 2007, the annual collected premiums had increased 9 times during the 
10 years. Crops valued at 279 billion RMB were secured by agricultural insurance in 
2017 compared with that of at 112.6 billion RMB in 2007. The insured area increased 
more than 9 times, starting from 230 million Mu in 2007 to 2.1 billion Mu in 2017, 
which took up 84.1% of the national planted acreage.  
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2.3 Current mechanism of crop insurance in China 
Agricultural insurance has been available in all provinces since 2017 compared 
with the pilot projects in few selected provinces at the beginning of the nation 
establishment. Similar to the international definition, planting insurance and animal 
husbandry insurance are the two major agricultural insurance in China, including 211 
different products in agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery sector. China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) in 2010 released an official document 
named Opinions on Strengthening the Cooperation between Agriculture-related 
Credit and Agriculture-related Insurance. Besides the emphasis of developing new 
variety of agricultural insurance products, the document encouraged the cooperation 
between banks and agricultural insurance companies providing preferential loan rate 
and faster loan application to farmers. The first agricultural insurance-based loan was 
granted in Yangling, a district in Shaanxi province (2016). The annual interest rate 
was 6%, which was 2~3% lower than other institutions who also provides agricultural 
loan. 0.5 million RMB was granted from PICC to a hog farmer. Not only banks and 
insurance companies, private companies like JD Finance (2018) also collaborates with 
insurance company, developing a loan product named “Jingnongdai” which accepts 
the animal husbandry from China United from farmers as the collateral in order to get 
the animal husbandry-related loan. 
The percentage of contract coverage for the three major grain crops: maize, 
rice and wheat already achieved 70% (Gov, 2017). According to the Research Report 
on China's Agricultural Insurance Guarantee Level published by Chinese Academy of 
Agricultural Sciences (2017), China has become the world's second largest country in 
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terms of the collected premium in agricultural insurance business, after the United 
States, and the largest country in Asia. The report also predicted that the guarantee 
level of agricultural insurance will achieve 24% by 2020, and access 40% by 2030, 
approaching the level of developed countries. 
If the agricultural insurance is subsidized by the government, its premium is 
determined based on different variety and different province. In 2016, the Ministry of 
Finance released the document named Central finance administration of agricultural 
insurance premium subsidy (2016) pointed out the insurance varieties that central 
government would subsidize and the relevant standard (Table 1). As shown in the 
table, since local government may compensate differently according to the standard, 
the governmental subsidy with respect to wheat, corn and rice is calculated based on 
the actual crop insurance product provided by Anhua insurance company (Table 2). 
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Table 1. Government insurance premium subsidization standard 
Category Products Insurance Subsidy 
Planting Corn, rice, wheat, cotton, potato, oil plant, sugar plant 
On the basis of provincial financial subsidies of at least 
25%, the central government subsidizes 40% for the 
central and western regions and 35% for the eastern 
regions, 65% for Xinjiang Production and Construction 
Corps, the reclamation areas directly under the central 
government, China Grain Reserve Management 
Corporation, China Agricultural Development Group 
Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the central unit). 
Breeding Breeding sow, cow, growing-finishing pig 
On the basis of at least 30% subsidies from provincial 
and sub-provincial finance (hereinafter referred to as 
local finance), the central government subsidizes 50% in 
the central and western regions, 40% in the eastern 
regions and 80% in the central units. 
Forestry 
Public good forests that have 
basically completed the 
reform of forest tenure 
system, the clarity of 
property rights, the normal 
production and management, 
and commercial forests. 
On the basis of local financial subsidy of at least 40%, 
the central financial subsidizes 50%, and the central 
financial subsidizes 90% for Daxing'anling Forestry 
Group Company. On the basis of provincial financial 
subsidy of at least 25%, the central financial subsidizes 
30%, and the central financial subsidizes 55% for 
Daxing'anling Forestry Group Company. 
Others 
Highland barley, yak, Tibetan 
sheep (hereinafter referred to 
as Tibetan varieties), natural 
rubber and other variety 
required by the central 
government 
On the basis of provincial financial subsidy of at least 
25%, the central financial subsidizes 40%, and for 
central units, the central financial subsidizes 65%. 
 
Table 2. Wheat, corn and rice insurance premium and governmental subsidy 
(unit in RMB/Mu) 
Product Initial premium  Premium after subsidy Subsidy range 
Wheat 15~27.5 3~5.5 63%~89% 
Corn 15~36 3~7.2 60%~91% 
Rice 17.5~32 3.5~6.4 63%~89% 
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The responsibilities are almost the same across different crop insurance 
contracts, including the natural disaster rainstorms, floods, waterlogging, wind, hail, 
freezing, droughts, earthquakes, debris flow, landslide, pests and diseases. When the 
damage within the responsibilities occurs, farmers need to contact the custom service 
directly or ask the local staff to contact the custom service. The insurance company 
will send agricultural experts and staffs to investigate and claim the damage. The 
statement of indemnity will be posted to the public in the village. After the expiration 
of public notice, the insurance company will transfer the payout to farmers’ bank 
account. 
In the United States, for crop insurance products, the expected indemnity E[I] 
is calculated based on the guarantee level. The guarantee yield is estimated for each 
insured farm based on ten years of yield records and the guarantee level is chosen by 
each farmer. Then the expected indemnity for a typical yield insurance contract is 	3[4] = 567[0, 89 − 8]	:9 
 where 89 is the guarantee yield per acre, 8 is the actual farm yield per acre, :9 is the 
guarantee price (Makki & Somwaru, 2001). 
Unlike the United States, the agricultural insurance system is still developing 
in China. Therefore, the payment calculation can be slightly different from crop to 
crop and province to province. Using corn yield insurance in Shandong province from 
Anhua Agricultural Insurance Company (Anhua, 2019) as an example, most of the 
insurance companies estimate the payout as  3[4] = the	maximum	payout	standard ∗ 	damage	ratio ∗ damaged	area 
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where the maximum payout standard varies across different growth period, damage 
ratio is defined differently in different crop and province which will be elaborated 
later, and damaged acre is usually measured in Mu. 
Other insurance contracts measure the expected indemnity as, taking rice yield 
insurance in Anhui province from Guoyuan Agricultural Insurance Company 
(GUOYUAN, 2015) for an example,  3[4] = the	maximum	payout	standard ∗ (damage	ratio − 10%) ∗ damaged	area 
where farmers will not receive any payment if the damage ratio is below (including) 
10%, 
or taking crop insurance in Jilin province from Anhua (2015) for instance, 3[4] = the	maximum	payout	standard ∗ damage	ratio ∗ payment	index∗ damaged	area 
where payment index is an index based on the loss percentage of production cost. 
Besides the difference in expected indemnity calculation, some crop contracts 
indicate that farmers will not receive any payment if the damage ratio is below 
(including) 30%, for example the crop insurance in Jilin province from Anhua (2015) 
In terms of the damage ratio, measurement can be different across contracts. Most of 
the crop insurance contracts define damage ratio as the reduction of production within 
the responsibility divided by the normal production which is determined by the local 
government, for instance the crop insurance in Jilin province from Anhua (2015). 
While the rice insurance in Anhui province from Guoyuan uses the number of 
damaged plants per unit area divided by the average number of plants per unit area as 
the damage ratio. 
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Though different calculations are applied based on different crop and province, 
one common statement that can be found in all contracts is that as long as the damage 
ratio goes beyond 80%, it will be defined as total crop failure and farmer will receive 
the payment based on the total insured area. 
2.4 Literature review on the demand of agricultural insurance 
Encouraged by recent performance, there is no doubt that the Chinese central 
government will attach increasing importance to the development of agricultural 
insurance industry. It can be foreseen that more varieties of agricultural insurance 
products will appear in the market. Therefore, it is necessary to study the demand of 
agricultural insurance, explaining the factors that affect its purchases, which helps the 
products become more useful to meet the actual needs of Chinese agricultural 
economy and better embrace the new era of Chinese agricultural insurance 
development. 
The demand for agricultural insurance has been studied for a long history. 
Plenty of preliminary studies have examined factors related to farmers’ purchase of 
crop insurance. Early in late 20th century, Hazell et al (1986) developed an experiment 
that allowed farmers to choose between insuring or not insuring maize and beans, and 
to choose among three different insurance policies or any linear combinations of them. 
The experiments were conducted under the national food plan in Mexico, a program 
aimed to achieve national self-sufficiency in food and raise the income of farmers in 
rainfed areas. In this study, the insurance was free. The researchers segmented the 
respondents into two groups based on their risk perception: risk neutral and risk 
averse. The result showed that nearly all maize crops were insured when policies were 
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available. Furthermore, for farmers who were risk-neutral, maize insurance was even 
voluntarily purchased. The small disappointment appeared in bean production as the 
result indicated that in both insured and not insured cases, bean production was 
reduced to the minimal level which was required to meet family consumption.  
Unlike Hazell et al. who used experiment to test the demand of maize and bean 
insurance, Coble et al. (1996) applied panel data of Kansas wheat farmers to examine 
the demand of Multiple Peril Crop Insurance (MPCI). The data contained records of 
354 farms who produced wheat every year between 1977 and 1990. The empirical 
results revealed that the mean and variance of both market returns and the returns to 
insurance are significant. To be more specific, the expected return to insurance and the 
variance of market return were positively correlated with the insurance purchase 
decision. The variance of return to insurance, expected market return and net wealth 
had a strong negative impact on the probability of purchasing insurance. The 
coefficient of wheat acres was significant and positive as well. The variance of 
indemnity had negative effect on MPCI participation which indicated that producers 
who expected to frequently receive smaller indemnities were more likely to insure 
than producers who rarely got large. And the price elasticity of demand was -0.65 
which meant farmers were inelastic to the premium changes.  
Enjolras et al. (2012) extended the study of demand for crop insurance to the 
countries comparison, in this case France and Italy. Their sample included 9306 farms 
belonging to the Farm Accountancy Data Network, with 2998 from France and 6308 
from Italy. They found little differences between French and Italian farmers. The 
results showed that agricultural indicators such as farm size referring to the cultivated 
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area, and diversification referring to the number of grown crops, were factors 
influencing the insurance purchase decision in both countries. However, financial 
characteristics of the farm such as leverage and returns on equity were not significant 
in the two countries, since the researchers assumed that a farm with higher debts is 
more willing to insure to maintain the agricultural activity. Other variables like 
weather conditions had no influence on insurance decision as well. 
In general, based on the previous research conducted by Gardner and Kramer, 
Goodwin and Smith, Knight and Coble, and Coble and Knight, factors such as the 
costs and returns of insurance, yield and other business risks, financial risks, farm size, 
enterprise and other forms of diversification, coverage levels, and relationships to 
adverse selection and moral hazard were factors that potentially affected the crop 
insurance purchase decision. However, farmers’ choices on types and levels of 
coverage have been expanded, as new varieties of agricultural insurance appeared in 
the market. Realized by the fact of the increasing complexity of agricultural insurance 
alternatives, researchers are attaching more attention to understand the factors that 
influence farmers’ purchase decisions among available crop insurance products.  
In terms of studying the decision among different types of agricultural 
insurance, Sherrick et al. (2004) found more evidence in crop insurance purchase 
decision when given different choices. They used two-stage process to investigate 
whether a purchase decision was made or not. Data was collected from 3,000 farmers 
in Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa states. The results indicated that farmers who were older 
and less wealthy, had larger acreages and higher leveraged farms, and perceived yield 
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farmers were more likely to choose revenue protection instead of more specific yield 
and hail protection.  
Another research area refers to the same type of agricultural insurance product 
with different combinations. Vandeveer, M. L (2001) studied the factors that 
influenced farmers’ purchase decision given various hypothetical insurance contracts 
through survey under the context of litchi in Vietnam. The insurance products were 
different in yield guarantee (85%; 90%), indemnity price (15,000 dong/kg, 25,000 
dong/kg, 35,000 dong/kg) and premium level (Low; High). The contracts were offered 
for the district and commune insurance. The results showed that farmers were more 
interested in the district than the commune insurance and they preferred the 90% 
guarantee level over the 85% guarantee level. Moreover, lower indemnity prices were 
more attractive to farmers. However, farmers were not very responsive to the 
reductions in premiums. In other words, farmers’ response to premium changes were 
inelastic. From the regression results, farmers preferred insurance with higher yield 
guarantee, lower indemnity price. And farmers with higher average total income were 
more likely to purchase insurance.  
Few preliminary researches on the demand for agricultural insurance exist in 
Chinese literature, especially experimental research Zhang, Shi, & Gu, 2007). Ning, 
Xing and Zhong (2005) used survey to investigate the factors of farmers’ purchase 
decision on cotton insurance. The sample selection was divided into three stages. In 
the first stage, Shihezi Xiang, Shihezi Zongchang, Xinhu Zongchang, 141 Tuanchang 
and Manas county were selected based on the cotton yield and the principle of 
equidistant. In the second stage, each district selected four villages according to the 
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same principle as in the first stage. In the third stage, researchers randomly sent out 
survey to farmers and collected data. A total of 450 surveys were received and 340 of 
them were valid. Probit model was adopted in the paper. The results showed that the 
coefficient of variability on cotton production is positively related to the purchase 
decision, which means the higher variability of cotton production, the higher 
probability that farmers would purchase cotton insurance. Moreover, the larger the 
total land, the longer the farmer attends farming activity, the higher the cotton revenue 
percentage of total revenue, farmers would be more willing to purchase cotton 
insurance. It’s also noticeable that receiving disaster subsidy positively affects the 
purchase decision which can be explained that although farmers can maintain living 
using post-disaster subsidy, the production loss cannot be compensated which makes 
farmers difficult to recover the activity. 
Zhang, Shi and Gu (2007) used experimental method and analyzed the demand 
for wheat insurance from three aspects: substitution effect between insurance and 
other goods, the ranking of agricultural insurance among different varieties and the 
comparison between the cost of different methods of agricultural risk diversification. 
The research was carried out in 11 villages in Henan province. Students randomly 
investigated around 60 farmers in each village. The questionnaire included three parts: 
demographic information, risk situation and perception of governmental subsidy. They 
found that though natural risk is the major risk in agricultural production, the market 
of agricultural insurance commercialization is unclear due to the low income of 
farmers and the less preference of agricultural insurance compared with other 
insurance products. Moreover, education, working out of the farm and total income 
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significantly affect farmers’ purchase decision on agricultural insurance. Furthermore, 
working out of farm, disaster loss from last year and knowledge on agricultural 
insurance have impact on the perception of the necessity of agricultural insurance.  
To conclude this chapter, it can be seen that as the safety net to both farmers 
and the nation, agricultural insurance receives huge attention from Chinese 
government. Though it did not development smoothly in China, the government is still 
encouraging the relative research. Most of the current studies focus on whether 
farmers purchase an agricultural insurance on a given agricultural insurance product, 
or farmers’ choice between different types of agricultural insurance products. Seldom 
does the literature center on the purchase decision on the same type of agricultural 
insurance product with different combinations. The goal of this study is to analyze 
farmers’ choice among different combinations of the same crop insurance product. 
The CE is adopted to study farmers’ preference towards the hypothetical insurance 
product. In the next chapter, how preliminary researches studied on the agricultural 
insurance, the econometrics behind the choice experiment will be discussed
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
 The demand for agricultural insurance in both western and Chinese literature is 
discussed in the previous chapter, this chapter focuses on the methodology (Choice 
experiment) and its related literature. Moreover, the econometrics of both conditional 
and mixed logit model which act as the analytics tools in this study are presented, 
along with the properties and the comparison between the two models. 
3.1 Literature review on the choice experiment 
Choice experiment (CE) is a type of analysis that typically has applied goals 
related to transport studies, environmental valuation, and food choices (Adamowicz, et 
al.,1998; Jayne, et al., 1996; Unterschultz et al., 1998), predicting customers choice by 
determining the relative important attributes. In CE, respondents are presented by 
different hypothetical alternatives in choice sets. Each alternative is described by 
levels of a set of predefined attributes. The tradeoff between different factors can be 
therefore analyzed through the choice that consumers made. Furthermore, if there is a 
price-related attribute in the experiment design, the willingness to pay (WTP) for other 
attributes can be estimated. The technique originates from Lancaster’s theory of value 
and random utility theory (1966). It assumes that consumer’s utility is derived from 
the consumption of the attributes associated with the good or service instead of the 
good or service itself. Then McFadden’s choice model (1973, 2001) states that 
consumers have the ability to rank good and service which are combined with 
different attributes and consumers are willing to make compensatory decision. When 
consumers making tradeoff between alternatives, the unattractive levels of an attribute 
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in an alternative can be compensated by attractive levels of another attribute, then 
consumers compare the overall utility obtained from the two alternatives. 
3.1.1 Application of the choice experiment to agricultural insurance 
In agricultural literature, most of the preliminary studies focused heavily on 
logit and probit model under the utility theory. Recently, increasing research appear in 
the literature using CE to study the demand of agricultural insurance. Zooming into 
agricultural insurance sector, Wang and Lu (2018) conducted a choice experiment to 
explore Chinese corn producers’ demand for alternative types of insurance. The 
experiment was carried out in ten villages in four cities in Liaoning province. They 
adopted in person interview and received valid data from 198 rural households. There 
were five attributed in the choice experiment: insurance products, indemnity, self-paid 
premium, time to receive indemnity payment and government/ private. A combination 
of alternative levels of the attributes form one option. In each round, five options, one 
for each product, plus an opt-out were provided for farmers. Each farmer experienced 
eight rounds, called one situation. Using random sample design in SAS with D-
efficiency design, 48 situations were selected in the experiment. Since each farmer did 
eight choices, the 48 situations were blocked into six groups. Besides the choice 
experiment, researchers also investigated four parts: demographics, economics, 
production and risk attitude. The results denoted that farmers preferred yield 
insurance, index insurance, price insurance over revenue insurance since yield 
insurance is the primary insurance available and the one that farmers most familiar 
with. Moreover, farmers were willing to purchase a corn insurance with greater 
subsidy, higher indemnity, shorter time to receive payout and is provided by a state-
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owned insurance company. Furthermore, from the results of willingness to pay with 
respect to each attribute, the government ownership was a more important factor than 
the fast payment. And for every Yuan increased in the indemnity, the WTP was 
increased by 3 to 18 cents. 
Vigano et al (2014) conducted a CE in Ethiopia regarding the smallholder 
farmers’ preferences and willingness to pay for weather derivatives. There were 120 
rural households who lived in the Wolayta zone in Southern Ethiopia as the 
respondents. Farmers were randomly selected from a larger sample of 360 farmers 
who already participated in a three-year data collection project and they came from 
three different villages that represented different agro-ecological zones in terms of 
altitude, rainfall patterns, and household livelihood strategies. The researchers 
designed a discrete choice experiment instead of using survey-based techniques. Focus 
group interviews were first carried out in the villages in order to understand 
household’s perception on drought risk. In later fieldwork, they performed the CE that 
contained eight different choice situations and an extra choice which was a strictly 
dominant alternative to allow for potential inconsistency. Within each choice situation, 
the respondent could choose one of the two different insurance products or the status 
quo alternative. Five categories of the product attributes were chosen in this study: 
covered season, intensity of drought, supplier, premium, and compensation. They ran 
two models: conditional logit and mixed logit model. Comparing the results, all the 
coefficients were almost significant and the overall goodness of fit was higher under 
mixed logit model. Moreover, the standard deviation of the two random coefficients 
were significant. These observations suggested that mixed logit was more appropriate. 
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The results from mixed logit showed that premium, compensation and perceived 
drought frequency significantly affected the insurance take-up. Unlike the other two 
attributes, an unexpected negative coefficient sign was received by compensation. The 
researchers interpreted that farmers were reluctant to insure against larger losses as the 
result of perceived unfairness in the premium/compensation ratio, since large losses 
rarely happened. They also found that WTP had a non-linear relationship with 
economic situation. In other words, very poor farmers had nothing at stake in the case 
of drought, while very rich ones can diversify the risk and need less insurance. 
Liesivaara and Myyrä (2014) conducted a CE in Finland to indicate the 
demand for crop insurance products in 2012. They sent the survey to 5,000 farmers. In 
the questionnaire, respondents were presented six crop insurance product cards. Each 
choice card included two different crop insurance products with varying attributes. 
Farmers were asked to select the most desirable crop insurance product for them. They 
could also choose an opt-out which indicates that the respondent won’t purchase crop 
insurance at all. There were 42 choice cards in total, being grouped into seven blocks. 
Other attributes chosen for the insurance products were the insurance cover 
(deductible), type of insurance, and expected indemnity (scale). The researchers 
conducted a pilot survey with 105 farmers first. They then used the prior information 
to better design the later experiment for it gave the expected signs of the parameters 
which was known as the Bayesian design. According to the pilot survey, price and 
deductible negatively affected on the demand for crop insurance. Expected indemnity 
had positive relationship with the demand for crop insurance. The prior results were in 
line with the preliminary studies. After the pretest, the visual version of choice cards 
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was presented in order to ensure that the choice cards were visually independent of 
each other. Then the experiment was run in the field. The results showed that all 
coefficients had expected signs and farmer’s demand for crop insurance was inelastic 
in the premium range overall. The premium and deductible negatively correlated with 
farmers’ purchase decision, while the expected indemnity positively affected on 
farmers’ utility. The coefficient for the farm insurance type was significantly negative, 
denoting that farmers preferred index insurance where compensation is based on 
regional indices over farm-specific insurance where an inspection is needed if the farm 
experiences a crop loss. The outcomes also revealed that the demand was higher 
among younger farmers and farms with more arable land. They also found that 
farmers' willingness to pay for crop insurance products was very sensitive to the 
premium interval presented in the CE design. 
3.2 Econometrics of conditional and mixed logit model 
Several approaches are available to model farmers’ demand of crop insurance. 
In the CE, the random utility is determined by a deterministic ( ) and a stochastic 
( ) component.  
 
where  is the ith consumer’s utility of choosing alternative j,  is the 
systematic portion of the utility function determined by the crop insurance attributes 
and their values for alternative j, and  is a unobserved stochastic element.  
The probability that a consumer chooses alternative j is given by 
 for all  
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where  is the choice set for respondent i. In the first experiment,  
since there were two alternatives in each card,  in the second experiment 
in that the alternatives were extended to three. 
When the random error  is independent and identically distributed (IID) 
across the j alternatives and N individuals with Gumbel or Fisher-Tippett extreme 
value type I (EV1),  
 
where  is the location (mode),  is the scale. 
Given the assumptions, the model is called Conditional Logit Model, and the 
logit probability in this case is (McFadden, 1973) 
 
Ceteris paribus,  and  
Suppose the utility that a farmer obtains from choosing alternative j is a linear 
combination of the insurance product attributes . Then the functional form of the 
utility function is expressed as 
 
where  represents the kth attribute for alternative j for consumer i, and 
stands for the coefficients to be estimated. In this study,  since there are five 
attributes. 
With  being IID, the conditional logit imposes the independence from 
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption which means the ratio of two probabilities 
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does not depend on the third event (McFadden, Tye, & Train, 1977). It can be proved 
through the probability ratio of choosing between j and l. 
 
From the above equation, it can be seen that the probability ratio only depends 
on the attributes of j and l, and not on the attributes of other alternatives. As the 
conditional logit model assumes IID, and owns the IIA property, it assumes that all 
respondents share the same coefficients in terms of all attributes. However, such 
assumptions will be unrealistic if unobserved heterogeneity exists in the form of taste 
variations in a factor. Similar with the conditional model, the mixed logit model is 
then introduced to overcome the restriction by allowing for the estimates to vary 
across individuals.  
In general, the coefficient vector for individual i is 
 
where  represents preferences for the average respondents (population mean), 
parameters in  are preference variations with respect to the average marginal utility, 
and  is the independent standard normal deviates. 
Therefore, the probability under the Mixed Logit Model is presented as (Train, 
2003) 
 
where  is the density function.  
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Taking the ratio of two alternatives, the property of IIA is no longer valid in 
the mixed logit model. 
It is inconvenient to directly interpret the estimates from both logit models. 
However, willingness to pay (WTP) can be derived to display a more obvious result 
(Train, 2003).  
 
where  is the price coefficient. 
In the case of mixed logit model, the price coefficient is fixed, in order to 
ensure the WTP is normally distributed. And the other advantage is that the price 
coefficient of all respondents will be negative, while this may not be true when the 
coefficient is assumed to be normally distributed. 
This chapter reviews the literature on CE and its application in agricultural 
insurance sector. The econometrics of conditional and mixed logit model are included, 
along with the properties and the comparison between the two models. The design of 
two experiments in this paper and the descriptive results from the fields will be 
presented in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND DATA DESCRIPTION 
The details of designing the two rounds of choice experiment are provided in 
this chapter, including the explanation of D-optimal design, variable selection and 
description, and expected results. Besides CE, the design of survey part, the other part 
of both rounds, and the descriptive results from the survey are presented. In addition, 
the how the two rounds of experiments were carried out is described in this chapter. 
4.1 Design of the experiment 
 4.1.1 Design of the first experiment 
The first experiment includes two sections: CE (Card 1) and survey (Appendix 
1). The CE was created under the D-optimal design, which was generated through 
JMP software under the Choice Design tab. D-optimal designs minimize the 
generalized variance of the estimated regression coefficients. Suppose matrix X 
represents the matrix of independent variables in the regression. D-optimal designs 
minimize the overall variance of the estimated regression coefficients through 
maximizing the determinant of X’X (NCSS). In the first experiment, there were five 
attributes (more descriptions in the following text): Frequency with five levels, 
Coverage with four levels, Premium with 8 levels, Insurer with two levels and 
Collateral with two levels. Since the completely replicated factorial design of the first 
experiment would require 5*4*8*2*2 = 640 different combinations, an exhaustive 
search of all possible designs (full factorial design) for a given sample size is not 
feasible. The D-optimal design is therefore chosen as a reasonable choice to decide 
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which 120 of the 640 possible should be included in the CE, given the limited budget 
can afford only 120 combinations.  
The D-optimal algorithm begins with a randomly selected set of combinations. 
Combinations in and out of the current design are exchanged until no exchange can be 
found that will increase the determinant of X’X. Oftentimes, this method does not 
guarantee the global maximum. To overcome this problem, the algorithm is repeated 
several times in hopes that at least one iteration leads to the global maximum. The D-
optimal algorithm can be used to deal with both quantitative and qualitative attributes. 
The levels of quantitative factors are scaled with the minimum value at -1 and the 
maximum value at 1. The levels of qualitative factors are further represented by 
(number of levels - 1) that amount of variables. For example, if a qualitative variable 
contains three levels, there will be two variables generated to represent this factor. 
Moreover, since the first experiment does not organize any pilot survey prior to the 
fieldwork, all coefficients of the attributes are specified to have a prior mean of zero 
and a finite variance.  
The CE reveals farmers' preference of different sets of crop insurance, which 
provides the evidence to study the demand. Ten blocks were developed, which means 
that there were ten different versions of CE. Each block contained six cards and each 
card had two alternatives (hypothetical insurance products). The opt-out was excluded 
in the design since the major focus of this study is to understand how farmers value 
the trade-off between the attributes that potentially affect their purchase decision. 
There were five attributes in the card (Frequency, Crop coverage(RMB/Mu), Crop 
premium(RMB/Mu), Type of insure, Can be used as collateral) with a set of levels. 
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Levels are determined by the current offerings in the market. An alternative was the 
combination of five attributes with a specific level. There was also a question 
regarding the certainty of the choice, which ranges from 1 to 5 as the certainty degree 
rising. (Table 3 & 4). 10 respondents were expected for each block and the first 
experiment would be conducted in three provinces. Therefore, there would be 100 
respondents in each province and a total of 10*6*2*10*3 = 3600 data was expected to 
collect. 
Table 3. Sample cards in the first experiment 
 Crop insurance 1 Crop insurance 2 
Frequency 1 in 6 years 1 in 4 years 
Indemnity (RMB/Mu) 500 300 
Crop Premium (RMB/Mu) 17.64 1.8 
Type of insurer Private Private 
Can be used as collateral Yes Yes 
Your choice   
How certain of your choice 1        2        3        4        5 
 
 Crop insurance 1 Crop insurance 2 
Frequency 1 in 4 years 1 in 2 years 
Indemnity (RMB/Mu) 500 600 
Crop Premium (RMB/Mu) 28.44 1.8 
Type of insurer Private Government 
Can be used as collateral Yes Yes 
Your choice   
How certain of your choice 1        2        3        4        5 
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Table 4. Variable abbreviation and description 
Attribute and 
Abbreviation Description Level 
Frequency of disaster 
(Frequency) 
(Damage frequency) How often a 
disaster happens that will trigger the 
indemnity 
1 in 2yrs, 1 in 4yrs, 
1 in 6yrs, 1 in 8yrs, 
1 in 10yrs 
Crop premium (RMB/Mu) 
(Premium) 
How much a farmer pays for the 
insurance company per Mu 
1.8, 8.64, 10.44, 
14.04, 17.64, 
24.84, 28.44, 35.64 
Indemnity (RMB/Mu) How much a farmer gets from the insurance company per Mu 300, 400, 500, 600 
Type of Insurer (Insurer) 0 = private insurance company, 1 = state-owned insurance company 
private, 
government 
Can be used as collateral 
(Collateral) 0 = No, 1 = Yes No, Yes 
  
Frequency as a measure of risk is given to farmers. Michaels, A, et al. (2017) 
showed that crop insurance reduces the risk in farm income. Thereofore, Frequency is 
expected to have negative correlation with the decision, assuming if the disaster 
occurring less frequently, farmers would be less willing to purchase a crop insurance. 
Premium and indemnity are included in that Woodard and Yi (2018) showed that they 
related to farmers’ utility. Moreover, in order to estimate the willingness to pay for the 
rest of the attributes, the factor of premium is necessary in the choice experiment. The 
levels were determined based on the most conservative calculation. Since the data in 
Table 2 was collected from Anhua agricultural insruance company, who provides the 
service only in several provinces, the premium range in Table 2 cannot represent the 
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whole agricultrual insurance market. Therefore, different subsidy percentges (5%, 
24%, 29%, 39%, 49%, 69%, 79%, 99%) were applied to the highest premium rate (36 
RMB/Mu) to capture the most conservativve premium range. Premium is supposed to 
have negative coefficient according to the traditional demand model. The level of 
indemnity took Wang and Lu (2018) and the public crop insurance contracts (Anhua, 
2019; Guoyuan, 2015) as the reference. Indemnity is expected to have a positive effect 
on the decision, since farmers would be more willing to receive higher payout given 
the same damage. Since the Chinese government continually encourages and funds the 
agricultural insurance market, it is important to understand farmers’ preference to 
different types of insurer. Insurer is expected to positively influence the decision, 
assuming that farmers tend to trust a state-owned insurance company more than a 
private one. According to the document released by CBRC (2010), the government is 
encouraging the cooperation between banks and insurance insurance companies, in 
order to better provide agriculture-related loan to farmers. Studying the current 
response toward the policy therefore has political implication which helps policy 
makers adjust the policy based on farmers’ feedback. Collateral is expected to 
generate positive impact since the cost of getting a loan would be lower if the crop 
insurance can be used as collateral, which facilitates farmers to engage agricultural 
productivity in the future.  
The CE is the main focus of this study and the survey section provides 
additional personal information to better depict farmers’ demand for crop insurance 
which includes four parts: Farm Characteristics and Farmer Risk Attitude (Part A), 
Sources of Risk and Risk Perceptions (Part B), Precautionary Savings (Part C) and 
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Crop Insurance Use and Perceptions (Part D). Part A investigates the demographic and 
basic farm-related information which provides the simple background of the 
respondents. Part B addresses risky activities in order to cluster farmers in three 
segments based on their risk perception. Part C puts forward saving activities to 
classify farmers into three groups according their precautionary attitude. Both Part B 
and C help to analyze whether farmers’ risk and precautionary perception affect their 
willingness to pay for the attributes. Part D raises farm-related questions which helps 
to explain the result from the CE and check whether the results from the CE are 
consistent with the observation in this part. 
 4.1.2 Design of the second experiment 
The second experiment was designed to provide a robust check of the previous 
result which also includes two sections: CE (Card 2) and survey (Appendix 2). In the 
second experiment, means and variance of previous estimates were used in the choice 
design. This method is named as the Bayesian D-optimal design which adjusts the D-
optimal design under Bayesian criteria. Since the prior measure is included, the 
extension allows to describe the conditional distribution of the experimental data for a 
given model parameter (Alexanderian, 2016). Without prior estimators, there is no 
way of knowing which attribute levels are better. In other words, a higher frequency of 
disaster may or may not be more desirable than a less frequency of disaster, a private 
insurance company may or may not be better than a state-owned insurance company, 
and so forth. As a result, some choice sets might not convey useful information in the 
first experiment. When including the estimate of prior means and variances of the 
attributes, the results will be leveraged, obtaining more precise estimates of the 
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parameters. According to Zhang’s dissertation paper (2006), Bayesian D-optimal 
designs are found to be more efficient and robust than non-Bayesian D-optimal 
designs. 
In addition, instead of ten blocks and six cards, there were three different 
blocks in total, with nine cards in each block. Instead of two alternatives in the 
previous design, the new design used three alternatives in each card (Table 5). 
Furthermore, pictures were included in the card, with the expectation that farmers 
would better understand the content in the CE. Level of certainty was included in case 
the abnormal phenomenon was observed which needed explanation. It needs to be 
emphasized that the wordings in the second experiment were identical to that of in the 
first experiment (Card 1). Besides the same wordings, by providing a different CE 
schema through altering the block design under the Bayesian D-optimal design, the 
second experiment provided a robust check, meaning the sign of the variables should 
remained the same.  
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Table 5. Sample cards in the second experiment 
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In terms of the survey part, due to the purpose of robust check, only basic 
information that related to demographic and purchase characteristics were contained. 
Risk perception and precautionary savings were excluded in the second experiment. 
Regarding the issue of expected number of respondents for each block, given the fact 
that there would be three blocks, nine choice situations and three alternatives, and the 
second experiment would be carried out in two provinces, 20 respondents were 
expected in each block to ensure the similar total number of data that would be 
collected, which was 3*9*3*20*2 = 3240 compared with 3600 in the first experiment. 
4.2 Fieldwork and sample description 
 4.2.1 First experiment in three provinces 
The first experiment of farmers was undertaken in China in May 2018 to study 
farmers’ demand of crop insurance. It involved farmers among three provinces: 
Shandong, the eastern region of China on the lower reaches of the Yellow River, 
bordering on the Bohai and Huanghai seas in the east; Shaanxi, the north-central 
region of China where the entire eastern border is constituted by the Yellow River; 
and Sichuan, the southwest region of China where the eastern part is the gate way to 
Tibet. The experiment lasted for a month and was conducted in the sequence of 
Shandong, Sichuan, and Shaanxi for the purpose that the researchers could bring the 
previous experience to the following fields, helping the following experiments to go 
smoothly. The local students assisted with the field work and were trained before 
going to the field. Ten different versions of the CE with six cards (choice situation) in 
each version were randomly assigned to the farmers and they were asked to choose 
only one alternative from each card. Recall from Chapter 2 that the crop insurance in 
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this paper was explained to farmers as a financial product that given the damage 
frequency (e.g. 1 in 2 years) , they pay the premium (e.g. 17.64 RMB/Mu) to an 
insurance company (e.g. a state-owned company), then if there was a disaster that 
generating damage ratio, for example, affecting 70% of the crop production compared 
with the average yield in normal years, farmers need to inform the insurance company 
and the insurance company will compensate farmers based on its calculation (e.g. 500 
RMB/Mu). 
4.2.1.1 Part A:  Farm Characteristics and Farmer Risk Attitude 
The total expected respondents should be 100 in each location. As the result 
turns out, a total of 297 respondents provided valid information in the first experiment. 
Among all 297 respondents. Several of the demographic indicators are similar among 
the three provinces for instance gender, age, total number of households, primary 
decision, education, years of farming, agribusiness environment, and nonagricultural 
income (Appendix 3). Overall, 62.7% of them are male, 37.3% are female. The 
average age of the respondents is 57.545 years old, with the minimum 23 and 
maximum 82. The average number of people in a household is 4.347 and roughly two 
people are working in the farm and one person works outside the farm. On average, 
78.4% of the respondents are the primary decision maker in agricultural affairs. In 
terms of education, 7.1% of the respondents never go to school, 32.3% of the 
respondents attend at least elementary school, 45.5% of the respondents attend at least 
middle school, 11.8% of the respondents attend at least high school, 3.0% of the 
respondents attend some university or college, and one respondent, accounting for 
0.3% of the respondents, completes college or university. The average years of 
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farming among all the respondents are 36 years, with a minimum of no experience, up 
to 69 years. Farmers who believe the current agricultural business in the area 
compared to last year is getting better in general takes up 43.4% of the total 
respondents. 37.7% of the respondents believe the agricultural business remains the 
same compared with the previous year. 18.9% of the respondents indicates that the 
current agricultural business is getting worse compared to the previous.  
However, there are other demographic factors that vary noticeably among three 
provinces. In terms of the government relationship, roughly 15.6% and 22.2% of the 
respondents have household member(s) working for village leader, committee, 
government-related institution in Shandong and Sichuan, respectively. Farmers in 
Shaanxi seemed have relatively weak belt with government, only 7% of the 
respondents had some relationship with government. Regional differences also appear 
in total Mu of contracting and transfer land. On average, farmers in Shandong have the 
largest Mu of contracting land, around 7 Mu per family, compared with 4 Mu in 
Shaanxi and Sichuan. However, Sichuan’s farmers own the largest amount of Mu in 
transferred land, 78.802 Mu, which is more than one and a half times of farmers in 
Shandong and 1065 times of Shaanxi. It is interesting to find out that the variation 
inside Shaanxi province is not significant at all while it is violent in both Shandong 
and Sichuan provinces. In Shaanxi province, the total amount of transferred land lies 
between [-8, 15], while the range expands to [-10, 2360] and [-8, 2000] in Shandong 
and Sichuan, respectively. Regarding agricultural income, Sichuan is the highest, 
followed by Shandong, while Shaanxi’s farmers only earn half of the agricultural 
income compared with the other two provinces. Though there is no significant 
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difference in non-agricultural income, including other expenses, farmers in Shaanxi 
have the lowest profits and Sichuan’s farmers are the wealthiest. 
There is no significant relationship between the area of owned land and 
transferred land. But the statistics show that larger amount of lands that are rented in is 
significantly impacted by a higher perception of farmer him/herself regarding farming 
ability. Moreover, the more lands are transferred, the higher the agricultural income 
and the net profits, and the less household members working outside the farm. 
4.2.1.2 Part B: Sources of Risk and Risk Perceptions 
Farmers are segmented into three groups in terms of risk perception and the 
overall cluster quality was fair (Table 6 & Appendix 4). In order to divide the 
respondents most effectively, the results from the Two Step Cluster Analysis show 
that question “Can you bear with higher risk?” is the most important indicator among 
the ten questions, followed by “Are you willing to try new technology but under 
certain risk?” and “Are you willing to try new mode of agribusiness management?”. 
According to the output, 32.1% of the total respondents are inclined to lower risk, 
20.9% of the population perceive risk in medium degree and 47% of the total 
respondents prefer higher risk. Zooming into three provinces, all have similar 
proportion in low risk preference group. However, Sichuan takes up a relatively higher 
percentage of farmers in medium risk group and fewer Sichuan’s farmers are in high 
risk group. In the case of Shandong and Shaanxi, most of the farmers accept higher 
risk. To conclude, both Shaanxi and Shandong’s farmers are willing to accept higher 
risk, especially Shaanxi, while farmers in Sichuan are more likely to be classified into 
the medium risk segment. 
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Table 6. Cluster analysis of risk perceptions 
 Shandong Shaanxi Sichuan 
Bin Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
weak 29 31% 32 34% 34 36% 
moderate 19 31% 15 24% 28 45% 
strong 48 35% 53 38% 38 27% 
 
4.2.1.3 Part C: Precautionary Savings 
Under the Two Step Cluster Analysis, the farmers are divided into three 
segments based on eight questions in the survey. (Table 7 & Appendix 5) The results 
indicate that the cluster quality is fair and question "Do you save in case losing job?" 
is the most important indicators, followed by "Do you save in case health emergency 
happening?" and "Do you save in case unexpected agricultural loss?". Among all 
respondents, 41.2% and 43.5% of them are classified into medium and high 
precautionary groups, respectively. 15.3% of the total respondents have relatively low 
precautionary perception. Taking a closer look at three provinces, in the case of 
Shaanxi, though almost half of the farmers are in the middle precautionary group and 
27% of the respondents are under the low precautionary segment, these 27% Shaanxi’s 
farmers contribute 60% in the overall low precautionary group. In other words, 
Shaanxi’s farmers are relatively less precautionary compared with the other two 
provinces, which is consistent with the conclusion in Part B. Farmers in Shandong 
dominate the medium precautionary group. Sichuan’s farmers are most precautionary 
among the three provinces.  
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Table 7. Cluster analysis of precautionary savings 
 Shandong Shaanxi Sichuan 
Bin Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
weak 9 20% 27 60% 9 20% 
moderate 54 45% 45 37% 22 18% 
strong 31 24% 28 22% 69 54% 
 
4.2.1.4 Part D: Crop Insurance Use and Perceptions 
When asking “how much do you know about crop insurance?”, farmers on 
average lie between the groups of “heard of it, but don’t know much” and “relatively 
understand it”. Analyzing the results by province, the statistics reveal that only one 
respondent in Shaanxi never heard of crop insurance, compared with three farmers in 
Shandong and 19 farmers in Sichuan. It can be seen that Sichuan’s farmers in general 
lack of knowledge on crop insurance relatively. Since Sichuan has relatively more 
farmers who lack knowledge on crop insurance, they are not as familiar as the other 
two provinces in general. In terms of the crop insurance coverage, 92.9% of the 297 
respondents indicate that crop insurance is available in their region. Only one record in 
Shaanxi and two observations in Shandong and Sichuan show that it is currently not 
available. It can be seen that farmers in Shaanxi are most familiar with crop insurance. 
It can be attributed to the government efforts and previous pilot projects that were 
carried out in Shaanxi, since it has relatively low income per family compared with 
other agricultural provinces. 
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4.2.2 Second experiment in two provinces 
The second experiment was conducted in two provinces, Jiangsu and Henan, in 
October 2018 and lasted for half of a month. Three different versions of the CE were 
randomly distributed to the farmers and they were asked to choose only one of the 
three alternatives in each card. A total of 120 farmers were involved in the second 
experiment, with 60 respondents in each province. With a substantial amount of 
details provided by the respondents in the first experiment, it was decided to use a 
reduced survey in the second round of experiment. Those results are provided in this 
section. The descriptive table shows that age, the total number of households, primary 
decision, education and years of farming are not the indicators that significantly 
differentiated two provinces. Farmers on average are 51.208 years old, with a 
minimum of 22 and a maximum of 83. The average number of households are 4.158. 
Among the total respondents, 60% of them make the primary decision in agricultural 
affairs. In terms of education level, 10.8% of the respondents never go to school, 
23.3% of the respondents attend at least elementary school, 43.3% of the respondents 
attend at least middle school, 18.3% of the respondents attend at least high school, 
4.2% of the respondents attend some university or college, none of the respondents 
completes college or university. The average years of farming are 27.833 years, with a 
minimum of no experience and a maximum of 55 years. (See Appendix 7) 
Noticeable differences are observed in the rest of the questions. Around 73.3% 
of the farmers in Henan are female, compared with 36.7% in Jiangsu. Although the 
average contracting lands are similar between the two provinces, the largest in Henan 
is more than one and a half times of that in Jiangsu. Larger gap appears in transferred 
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lands. In Henan, the range goes from -8.1 Mu to 35.5 Mu, while it extends to [-12, 
2000] in Jiangsu. Moreover, the average of transferred land in Jiangsu is 90 times of 
Henan. The impact is revealed in agricultural income and expense. The average 
agricultural income in Jiangsu is 26 times of Henan, and the net profit per year in 
Jiangsu is almost 6 times of Henan. The wealthiest farmers with respect to agricultural 
income in Jiangsu is 60 times of that in Henan. It can be seen from the descriptive data 
that farmers in Jiangsu are overall richer than Henan. 
This chapter discusses the design of both CE and survey in first and second 
round of experiment. Recall that no prior information is inputted to design the CE in 
the first experiment. The results from the second round are expected to perform as a 
robust check given the prior estimation is added into the design of the second CE. 
Moreover, the descriptive results from the survey in both rounds are presented. In the 
next chapter, it can be seen how those information help to interpret the results and 
whether the performance of models meet the expectations in the theory. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 Knowing the design of experiment and the expected results in both rounds (the 
first experiment was carried out from May-June 2018, the second experiment was 
carried out from Oct-Nov 2018) in the previous chapter, the empirical results from 
both conditional and mixed logit regressions logit with respect to both experiments are 
presented to be checked and analyzed. Because of the difference in experimental and 
block design, each experiment is investigated separately and compared, starting with 
the first experiment. Recall that in the second experiment, the D-optimal design is 
conditional for dominant alternatives under Bayesian criteria. For the CE results in 
each round, the overall result is presented first, followed by the results from individual 
province. At the end of each round, WTP with respect to each attribute in separate 
province and the overall situation are illustrated along with the interpretation. 
5.1 Discrete choice results of the first experiment 
5.1.1 Overall results of the three provinces 
Running both conditional and mixed logit regression, all variables are 
significant given the result under the Choice Model, which suggests that the chosen 
contract attributes are all relevant for farmers in this context (Table 8). In other words, 
all of the factors significantly affect the crop insurance purchases. Having a closer 
look, the two results show the effects in order of significance with a small difference. 
In the conditional logit regression, Frequency has the most significant effect, followed 
by Premium, Insurer and Indemnity. Though Collateral has the smallest effect, it is 
also significant, which indicates that farmers do not entirely ignore this attribute when 
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making a purchase decision. In terms of the mixed logit regression, Premium has the 
strongest effect on the purchase decision, followed by Insurer, Indemnity and 
Frequency. Though the top rankings are not exactly the same, Collateral still captures 
the smallest influence on whether farmers would purchase the hypothetical crop 
insurance. The F statistics indicates that both conditional and mixed logit model are 
valid. However, according to Akaike information criterion (AIC), mixed logit model 
performs better while according to Bayesian information criterion (BIC) which places 
a higher penalty on using degrees of freedom (DF) than AIC, conditional logit is 
preferred. The results are therefore not conclusive. Since the number of variables is 
not large, the heavier penalty on DF is not necessary. Hence, the following discussion 
is based on the mixed logit regression results. 
The negative estimate of Frequency indicates that as the frequency of disaster 
gets higher, farmers are more willing to purchase crop insurance which meets the 
expectation. Given the function of a safeguard to agricultural business and being as a 
significant factor, the result shows that farmers identify the role of insurance. When 
disaster occurs more frequently, harvest will be influenced so that the agricultural 
revenue will more likely to be fluctuated. To minimize the production loss, they 
therefore purchase crop insurance to make sure when agricultural income is hit by the 
disaster, at least a portion of their cost will get back, relieving the situation. If disaster 
occurs more rarely, farmers will be less likely to have the incentive to value the 
importance of purchasing crop insurance. 
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Table 8. Conditional logit (CL) and Mixed logit (ML) model comparison under 
overall data in the first experiment 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES CL ML. Mean ML. SD 
    
Frequency -0.347*** -0.378*** 0.195*** 
 (0.027) (0.047) (0.038) 
Indemnity 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Premium -0.063*** -0.065***  
 (0.005) (0.005)  
Insurer 0.968*** 1.009*** 0.169 
 (0.090) (0.098) (0.230) 
Collateral 0.430*** 0.445*** -0.290 
 (0.094) (0.108) (0.184) 
Observations 3,554 3,554 3,554 
LR chi2 527.260 23.130 
0.0001 Prob > chi2 0.000 
AIC 1946.188 1931.055 
BIC 1977.067 1986.637 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
A positive estimate of Indemnity meets the expectation as well. The result 
shows that farmers tend to make purchase of crop insurance with higher payout from 
the insurance company. Although the process of loss assessment relies on insurance 
company, and several farmers complained about the procedure of the settlement of 
claims in the fields, farmers are more likely to purchase crop insurance which states a 
higher indemnity in the contract. 
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The negative sign of Premium meets the expectation. As premium gets higher, 
farmers are less likely to purchase a crop insurance. Since it is the most important 
factor among all variables, it reveals that even if the government subsidy has already 
supported the most part of the crop insurance’s premium, farmers still strongly prefer 
lower crop premium than the higher one which follows the traditional downward 
sloping demand states.  
In terms of the type of insurer, a dummy variable is created, with 1 
representing the state-owned company, 0 standing for the private company. The 
positive estimate indicates that farmers tend to purchase crop insurance from state-
owned insurance company rather than private firm which meets the expectation, which 
is consistent with the result that Wang and Lu (2018) observed in Liaoning province. 
It is interesting to notice that farmers value this attribute as the second most important 
factor when they make a purchase decision on the crop insurance. Since Chinese 
government is continually encouraging the development of agricultural insurance 
market over recent years, more private companies enter the market and some even 
provide more kinds of products than state-owned insurance companies. However, 
from the result it can be seen that farmers trust the government-based insurance 
company more than the private ones. 
Collateral is also transformed in a dummy variable with 1 representing Yes and 
0 standing for No. The positive estimate shows that farmers are more willing to 
purchase crop insurance that can be used as collateral when they apply for a loan in a 
bank. CBRC (2015) released an official document in 2015, encouraging the 
collaboration between insurance company and bank. Several pilot projects have been 
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implemented in the recent years. However, whether the crop insurance can be used as 
collateral when applying for a loan is the least important one among all the significant 
factors. In other words, it generates the smallest impact on farmers’ purchase decision 
compared with other parameters. Therefore, it can be seen that even though several 
actions have been taken to spread the idea of using agricultural insurance as collateral, 
most of the farmers are not familiar with this concept. 
In general, farmers are more likely to choose crop insurance with lower 
premium, higher reimbursement, issued by a state-owned insurance company and can 
be used as collateral to get loan when given a higher frequency of disaster. 
5.1.2 Separate results of the three provinces 
Since the overall model aggregates the data of three provinces, the result 
assumes no difference in marginal effect. Therefore, it is valuable to look at the three 
provinces separately which allows the existence of geographic difference (Table 9).  
The statistical results show that the mixed logit model in all three provinces are 
not significantly different from the null model. This observation is revealed through 
the large p-value for the LR test. The null model assumes all coefficients of standard 
deviation terms are zero which is equivalent to the conditional logit model. Since there 
is no prior information used in the experimental design, it can be possible that mixed 
logit model does not significantly differ from conditional logit model. Similar 
coefficients from the two models reinforce the result. It is also interesting that all three 
provinces have lower AIC and BIC in conditional logit compared with mixed logit, 
meaning the conditional logit model is statistically better than the mixed logit model. 
 53 
Since all the estimates are almost the same and the assumption of mixed logit is more 
realistic, the following interpretation will use the results from mixed logit. 
 The mixed logit results from Shandong and Sichuan show that all attributes are 
significant except for Collateral. Also, the results from survey part indicate that this 
variable has the lowest average evaluation among all the attributes in all three 
provinces. In May 2018, Shandong Agricultural Development Credit Guarantee 
Company (SDNYDB) signed a contract with AnHua Agricultural Insurance Company 
(Shandong branch), determining the financial collaboration between the two parties on 
agricultural insurance products. Farmers who purchased the agricultural insurance 
from AnHua can enjoy the preferential policy on loan application in SDNYDB. 
Moreover, PICC developed a soybean insurance product in August 2018, which not 
only relieves the related production and market risk, but also can be used as collateral 
when applying the loan. Though more crop insurance products are available to obtain 
better loan policy, the concept is relatively new in Shandong and appeared after the 
fieldwork. Therefore, farmers in Shandong were unfamiliar with this concept during 
the survey and it can be the reason why Collateral is not significant in the model.
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Table 9. Conditional logit (CL) and Mixed logit (ML) model comparison under three provinces in the first experiment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Shandong. 
CL 
Shandong. 
ML. Mean 
Shandong. 
ML. SD 
Shaanxi. 
CL 
Shaanxi. 
ML. Mean 
Shaanxi. 
ML. SD 
Sichuan. 
CL 
Sichuan. 
ML. Mean 
Sichuan. 
ML. SD 
          
Frequency -0.527*** -0.556*** 0.166** -0.161*** -0.161*** 0.038 -0.405*** -0.423*** 0.168** 
 (0.054) (0.079) (0.075) (0.045) (0.047) (0.110) (0.049) (0.073) (0.068) 
Indemnity 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.000 0.004*** 0.004*** -0.000 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Premium -0.071*** -0.072***  -0.081*** -0.081***  -0.040*** -0.041***  
 (0.010) (0.010)  (0.009) (0.009)  (0.009) (0.009)  
Insurer 1.157*** 1.187*** 0.202 0.737*** 0.739*** -0.014 1.165*** 1.203*** 0.082 
 (0.172) (0.187) (0.595) (0.149) (0.150) (0.241) (0.163) (0.171) (0.291) 
Collateral 0.389** 0.368* -0.340 0.597*** 0.598*** -0.082 0.330** 0.344* 0.233 
 (0.176) (0.209) (0.310) (0.161) (0.164) (0.570) (0.163) (0.183) (0.250) 
          
Observations 1,168 1,168 1,168 1,186 1,186 1,186 1,200 1,200 1,200 
LR chi2 230.800 3.650 
0.456 
593.146 
638.714 
165.320 0.060 
0.9996 
674.691 
720.396 
187.380 3.95 
0..413 
658.451 
704.261 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AIC 588.794 666.748 654.397 
BIC 614.110 692.140 679.847 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Unfortunately, in Sichuan, no collaboration between insurance company and 
bank has been revealed online so far. The concept is therefore not familiar to the 
farmers when conducting the experiment and the variable is not significant. It was 
observed that whether the concept is familiar or not is critical when farmers making 
their choices. When farmers asked “How does the crop insurance function as a 
collateral?”, most of them still did not fully understand the concept after hearing the 
explanation from the students and hence the results were influenced by the 
understanding. However, crop insurance can be used as collateral is not a fresh idea 
under the case in Shaanxi. Early in 2016, the Shaanxi government had published the 
document, encouraging the pilot projects of agricultural insurance that can be used as 
collateral (Shaanxi Gov, 2016). To respond the governmental document, the first 
agricultural insurance-based loan was granted from PICC to a hog farmer in Shaanxi 
(2016). Influenced by the macro policy, farmers in Shaanxi have more chances to get 
exposure to this new type of insurance product and are therefore value this concept as 
significant. 
Farmers in Shandong and Shaanxi believe Premium has the largest impact on 
their purchase decision on a crop insurance, while Sichuan’s farmers value the type of 
the insurance company most. It can be seen from Table 10 that though farmers in 
Sichuan spend the largest money in agricultural production among three provinces, 
their income from both agriculture and non-agriculture sector are the highest as well. 
Furthermore, after considering other income and expense, farmers’ left income in 
Sichuan is significantly higher than the others. Therefore, it may due to personal 
wealth that farmers in Sichuan value the premium as the second least important 
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attribute when making a purchase decision on crop insurance, while Shandong and 
Shaanxi’s farmers believe the premium has the largest effect on decision making. 
Table 10. Farmers’ income and cost in three provinces 
Province 
Agricultural 
income 
Nonagricultural 
income 
Production cost Left income 
Shandong 102508.613 42552.857 74487.649 35989.992 
Shaanxi 5752.369 41607.212 2349.2 20722.883 
Sichuan 193990.253 58831.478 133529.511 87869.096 
 
According to the survey, 15.6% of the respondents have relative(s) working in 
government related institution in Shandong, 7% in Shaanxi and 22% in Sichuan. It 
shows that respondents in Sichuan have more connection with government. Since 
people’s perception can be influenced if they have relatives working for the 
government, farmers in Sichuan are likely to trust the government more than others. 
Therefore, when a crop insurance is offered, they tend to attach more concerns on 
whether it is provided by a state-owned insurance company or a private insurance 
company. 
5.1.3 Willingness to pay from the first experiment 
The below table (Table 11) indicates the WTP for the overall and three 
provinces respectively under conditional logit (CL) and mixed logit models (ML). It 
can be seen that the difference between the two models is trivial. Besides, farmers in 
Sichuan are willing to pay the highest amount for every increased two-years frequency 
of disaster, nearly two times of the average, while farmers in Shaanxi do not pay a lot 
of attention on that, roughly one third of the average. For every increased 100 yuan on 
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indemnity, farmers in Shaanxi have the most similar WTP to the average level, while 
farmers in Shandong and Sichuan are willing to pay less and more than the average 
respectively. In terms of the type of insurer, Shandong and Sichuan’s farmers are 
willing to pay more than the average for the state-owned insurance company, while 
farmers in Shaanxi would pay the least for the changing from private insurance 
company to state-owned insurance company. It is interesting that though farmers in 
Sichuan do not significantly value the importance of whether the crop insurance can 
be used as collateral, they have the highest WTP for this characteristic, which is even 
higher than Shaanxi's farmers who treat this property as a significant factor when they 
make a purchase decision on crop insurance. 
It is also noticeable that the WTP respecting all attributes in Sichuan are the 
highest among the three provinces, despite the fact from the survey part that none of 
the average evaluations of all attributes is the highest among three provinces and 
Sichuan’s farmers value themselves as the one who are not very familiar with the 
agricultural insurance products. The result of cluster analysis (Table 6 & 7 in Chapter 
4) supports the outcome, suggesting that farmers in Sichuan are classified in the least 
risky and most precautionary segment. Therefore, they are naturally willing to pay 
more to avoid the agricultural risk. The other potential reason could be the economic 
situation for Sichuan's farmers is better than the others. Furthermore, they may not 
have reference value to the question due to the lack of knowledge in crop insurance 
which is revealed through the question from Part D in the survey. 
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Table 11. WTP in the first experiment 
 3 Provinces Shandong Shaanxi Sichuan 
 CL ML CL ML CL ML CL ML 
Frequency -5.522 -5.847 -7.439 -7.699 -1.985 -1.981 -10.119 -10.394 
Indemnity 0.049 0.049 0.035 0.036 0.043 0.043 0.084 0.085 
Insurer 15.385 15.611 16.322 16.422 9.066 9.071 29.126 29.542 
Collateral 6.837 6.890 5.492 5.090 7.343 7.337 8.262 8.449 
 
5.2 Discrete choice results of the second experiment 
 5.2.1 Overall results of the two provinces 
One remarkable improvement in the second experiment is that both AIC and 
BIC are smaller under mixed logit model than that of under conditional logit model 
(Table 12), which means mixed logit performs better. Recall that in Chapter 4, 
Bayesian D-optimal designs which include the prior information are found to be more 
efficient and robust than non-Bayesian D-optimal designs. Since the second 
experiment design adopts Bayesian D-optimal design, the better performance of mixed 
logit model corresponds to a more effective design. The significant small p-value for 
the LR test also supports the observation. Moreover, based on the preference results 
under conditional and mixed logit models, all variables are significant and the signs all 
meet the expectation which reveals that the second experiment is the robust check. 
Compared with the first experiment, two results show similar effects in order of 
significance. In both models, farmers value Premium most, and consider the least 
effects of indemnity and collateral property. 
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Table 12. Conditional logit (CL) and Mixed logit (ML) model comparison 
under overall data in the second experiment 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Cl ML. Mean ML. 
SD 
    
Frequency -0.288*** -0.435*** 0.616*** 
 (0.032) (0.074) (0.065) 
Indemnity 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Premium -0.050*** -0.068***  
 (0.005) (0.007)  
Insurer 0.766*** 1.198*** 1.630*** 
 (0.086) (0.197) (0.161) 
Collateral 0.336*** 0.479*** -0.782*** 
 (0.070) (0.114) (0.131) 
    
Observations 3,240 3,240 3,240 
LR chi2 153.430 282.260 
0.000 Pro > chi2 0.000 
AIC 2229.577 1955.318 
BIC 2259.993 2010.068 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
5.2.2 Separate results of the two provinces 
In the second experiment, the LR test shows that the mixed logit model is 
significantly different from the conditional model. Besides, the performance of mixed 
logit model gets significantly improved (Table 13). For both provinces, the value of 
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AIC and BIC are smaller under mixed logit model, indicating that mixed logit model 
provides a better fit than conditional logit model. All variables in both provinces are 
significant under the Wald test and all signs meet the expectation.  
Table 13. Conditional logit (CL) and Mixed logit (ML) model comparison 
under three provinces in the second experiment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Jiangsu. 
CL 
Jiangsu. 
ML. Mean 
Jiangsu. 
ML. SD 
Henan. 
CL 
Henan. 
ML. Mean 
Henan. 
ML. SD 
       
Frequency -0.349*** -0.517*** 0.759*** -0.232*** -0.309*** 0.468*** 
 (0.046) (0.106) (0.107) (0.046) (0.086) (0.092) 
Indemnity 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Premium -0.049*** -0.073***  -0.052*** -0.068***  
 (0.007) (0.010)  (0.007) (0.010)  
Insurer 0.625*** 0.958*** 1.689*** 0.922*** 1.615*** 1.902*** 
 (0.121) (0.249) (0.236) (0.126) (0.313) (0.299) 
Collateral 0.241** 0.491*** 0.570*** 0.441*** 0.704*** 1.124*** 
 (0.098) (0.150) (0.190) (0.101) (0.189) (0.215) 
       
Observations 1,620 1,620 1,620 1,620 1,620 1,620 
LR chi2 85.100 164.86 
0.000 
84.910 124.810 
0.000 Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 
AIC 1111.403 954.543 1111.589 994.777 
BIC 1138.354 1003.054 1138.54 1043.288 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 61 
However, the effect of attributes does not have the similar order in two 
provinces. In Jiangsu, farmers value Premium the most, followed by Frequency, 
Insurer, Indemnity and Collateral. Farmers in Henan place the most importance on 
Premium, while value Insurer, Indemnity and Collateral in the following. Frequency 
has the least effect on the purchase decision on crop insurance.  
This result is also observed in the survey when farmers were directly asked the 
ranking of the importance among these attributes (Table 14). It can be seen that 
farmers in Henan do not value much about the frequency of disaster, which obtains 
significantly less valuation than that of in Jiangsu. Furthermore, whether the crop 
insurance can be used as collateral has the lowest average valuation in the survey for 
both provinces, indicating that it is the least or almost the least important factor in 
farmers’ minds. 
In Jiangsu, the agricultural income is nearly 26 times of Henan, and its left 
income of the year is almost 6 times of Henan. Moreover, the production cost is 
roughly 50% of the agricultural revenue in Henan, while 13% in Jiangsu. The data 
reveals that farmers in Jiangsu are much wealthier than Henan and agriculture in 
Jiangsu is more profitable than Henan (Table 15). Jiangsu’s farmers could be 
considered as the shrewd type of character. In other words, they would calculate how 
to maximize the profit with respect to the cost. Therefore, the premium of crop 
insurance as part of the agricultural expenses, is one of the concerns to farmers in 
Jiangsu. The interpretation is different in Henan. Since the production cost already 
takes up a large proportion of the agricultural revenue, and farmers’ agricultural 
income on average is relatively low, the premium of the crop insurance therefore 
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significantly relates to the profit they would earn. Moreover, farmers in Jiangsu has 
higher education and longer years of farming than Henan which helps Jiangsu’s 
farmers better understand how to efficiently allocate the cost. Hence, it can be seen 
that though both farmers in Jiangsu and Henan value the crop insurance premium as 
the most important attribute when they make a purchase decision, the behind reasons 
are not similar. 
Table 14. Average evaluation in the second survey 
 Frequency Premium Coverage Insurer Collateral 
Jiangsu 3.683 3.183 3.533 3.2 1.4 
Henan 2.883 2.967 2.983 3.067 2.85 
 
Table 15. Farmers’ income and cost in two provinces 
 Agricultural 
income 
Nonagricultural 
income Production cost Left income 
Jiangsu 375957.322 50325 50325 79161.767 
Henan 14525.442 30173.729 7048 13528.905 
 
To understand why the collateral property is the least important attribute, the 
development of insurance-based loan needs to be investigated. In 2016, the 
Department of Finance of Jiangsu Province, Postal Savings Bank of China (Jiangsu 
branch) and PICC jointly launched a loan product “Nongbaodai”, which accepts 
policy-supported agricultural insurance as collateral. Nongbaodai relies on the 
government’s financial risk compensation pool as the method of improving credit and 
provides financial support with a low cost and low threshold. The oriented objects are 
farmers’ cooperative, family ranch, agricultural specialist and agricultural enterprise. 
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By September 2018, 1200 farmers got financial support from Nongbaodai. The 
average transferred land in Jiangsu is around 165 Mu, including two farmers who rent 
in 1000 and 2000 Mu respectively. It is surprising that most of the respondents meet 
the standard of applying the insurance-based loan, but they do not respond to the 
preferential policy. It can be explained that most of the farmers are more willing to 
borrow money in the traditional way and hesitate to try this new borrowing procedure. 
Therefore, Collateral has the least influence on farmers’ purchase decision on crop 
insurance. According to Manager Xu of PICC Jiangsu branch, the current coverage is 
far below what was originally envisaged. Therefore, more public awareness 
campaigns are desirable to help farmers better understand the role of agricultural 
insurance in the procedure of loan application. 
Under the case of Henan, some agricultural insurance products which can be 
used as collateral when applying agriculture-related loan, started to appear in the 
market. However, the survey suggests that the average transferred land is around 2 
Mu, which is far below the large agricultural activity scale. Therefore, for the 
respondents in Henan, it is unnecessary to apply loan in order to enlarge the 
productivity scale. In other words, they would not place the collateral property as an 
important factor compared with other attributes like premium or the type of insurer. 
5.2.3 Willingness to pay from the second experiment 
It is observed that in the first experiment, the WTP in conditional and mixed 
logit model are almost the same, while in the second experiment there is a larger gap 
between the two sets of WTP in different models. (Table 16) This is due to the more 
effective experiment design after using the prior estimators. 
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Table 16. WTP in the second experiment 
 2 Provinces Jiangsu Henan 
 CL ML CL ML CL ML 
Frequency -5.762 -6.393 -7.092 -7.112 -4.476 -4.528 
Indemnity 0.044 0.041 0.048 0.040 0.041 0.042 
Insurer 15.309 17.616 12.729 13.173 17.821 23.697 
Collateral 6.708 7.046 4.898 6.749 8.515 10.321 
 
In terms of Frequency, farmers in Jiangsu are willing to pay more than the 
average when the disaster happens more frequently, while Henan’s farmers will pay 
less than the average. This is revealed in the survey, where the ranking of Frequency is 
higher in Jiangsu than in Henan (Table 14). In general, the weather condition is better 
in Jiangsu than Henan. Therefore, farmers in Jiangsu put more attention on the climate 
risk in case it influences the yield. For every increased 100 yuan on indemnity, 
farmers in both provinces have similar WTP. Regarding to the type of insurer, 
Jiangsu’s farmers are willing to pay less for the government than Henan’s farmers. It 
can be explained that overall, the economic environment in Jiangsu is better than 
Henan. More private companies participate in agricultural market in Jiangsu. 
Therefore, the perception of trust in government in Jiangsu is not as strong as Henan. 
Farmers in Henan are willing to pay more on a crop insurance that can be used as 
collateral in loan application than Jiangsu. It is an interesting result since this 
characteristic would be more useful for Jiangsu’s farmers since they have larger 
productivity scale than Henan’s farmers on average. One possible explanation could 
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be farmers in Jiangsu have not entirely accepted this new idea. Therefore, they are less 
willing to pay more for the thing they are uncertain about. 
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CHAPTER 6 
FUTURE WORKS AND CONCLUSION 
6.1 Futures works 
One observation when doing the experiment was that some farmers did not 
fully understand the setting of CE at the beginning in that they believed some levels 
stated in the choice were not realistic, so they couldn’t make a choice. Though this 
concern would be revealed by the level of certainty, obtaining a significant amount of 
uncertain choices will hurt the effectiveness of the experiment. Besides, an 
informative experiment is always desired in any research. One way to improve that 
could be dropping the first two or three questions in the CE, which refers to the 
“learning phase” to the respondent. Another alternative would be designing the CE 
with different levels in Premium and Indemnity through researching the available crop 
insurance products and the average indemnity in that region, making the CE looks 
more reasonable to farmers in that particular area. 
6.2 Conclusion 
The overall purpose of this study is to explain farmers’ demand for crop 
insurance in China. Two choice experiments in five provinces were carried out during 
May and June in 2018. The first experiment includes three provinces, covering 
different geographic regions. The signs of all estimates are significant based on the 
aggregate data and meet the expectation that farmers would prefer to choose a crop 
insurance with higher indemnity, lower premium, issued by a state-owned insurance 
company and can be acceptable as collateral when given a higher frequency of 
disaster. Zooming into three provinces, the separate mixed logit analysis is not 
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significantly different from conditional logit model. The signs all meet the 
expectation, however, Collateral is not a significant variable in Shandong and Sichuan 
under 99% significance level. It can be interpreted that the collateral property is a new 
concept to farmers in these two provinces, since a few projects are taken recently after 
the field experiment. Therefore, the unfamiliarity leads to the insignificant result. 
Farmers in Shandong and Shaanxi value Premium as the most important attribute, 
while this is not true for Sichuan’s farmers. Because of the noticeable higher wealth, 
farmers in Sichuan do not treat the cost of insurance as important as the other two 
provinces. On the other hand, Sichuan’s farmers place the most importance on the type 
of insurer. From the survey it can be seen that farmers in Sichuan have the strongest 
connection to the government which results in stronger trust in government. Therefore, 
the type of insurer significantly affects farmers’ purchase decision in Sichuan. 
Regarding to the WTP, farmers in Sichuan are willing to pay the highest amount for 
all other variables among the three provinces, even though they do not value Collateral 
as a significant attribute. The behind reason is not only the economic situation, but 
also could be the lack of knowledge on crop insurance products. 
The second experiment was conducted in two provinces with quite different 
economic background. Since prior information from the first experiment is used in the 
second experimental design, it excludes the dominant choices that appear in the first 
experiment. The performance of mixed logit improves significantly and is statistically 
better than the conditional logit. The signs all meet the expectation and are significant 
in both aggregate and separate cases. Though Premium significantly influences 
farmers’ decision on purchasing a crop insurance in both provinces, the underlying 
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reasons are not the same. Since the farmers in Jiangsu are significantly wealthier and 
have higher education and longer years of farming than Henan on average, they better 
understand how to allocate the cost and seek the optimal solution which minimizes the 
total cost while ensuring the largest profit. Therefore, as part of the cost, they believe 
premium of an insurance is critical. In the other case, farmers in Henan already borne 
with a relatively high proportion of production cost so that any additional cost will 
reduce the net profit they would earn. Therefore, premium becomes their biggest 
concern. Farmers in both provinces treat Collateral as the least or almost the least 
important factor when making a purchasing decision. It is interesting that in Jiangsu, 
there is an available crop insurance product that can be used as collateral to apply for 
loans, and many of the farmers meet the standard of the oriented objects. The reason 
why they do not attach a lot of attention on the collateral property can be the 
traditional thinking on borrowing therefore they are hesitant to try the new kind. The 
story is different in the case of Henan. It is unnecessary to apply loan to expand the 
agricultural production since the average transferred loan is around 2 Mu. Even if the 
crop insurance can be used as collateral, it does not provide extra benefit to farmers. 
Hence, farmers in Henan do not place Collateral as important factor when they make 
decision. The WTP in two provinces is consistent with the effects ranking in mixed 
logit analysis. It is noticeable that farmers in Jiangsu are willing to pay significantly 
less for a state-owned insurance company than Henan. It can be explained that private 
companies are more active in Jiangsu which leads to lower connection with the 
government. Hence, whether the insurer is a state-owned or private company is not as 
important in Jiangsu as that of in Henan.  
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To conclude, the findings are consistent with the expectation. In general, 
farmers prefer crop insurance with lower premium, higher reimbursement, issued by a 
state-owned insurance company and can be used as collateral to get loan when given a 
higher frequency of disaster. It has several practical implications including helping 
insurance companies and policy makers better develop the products or policies that 
increase the adoption rate of crop insurance in China. Noticing that farmers in 
different regions place the importance of factors differently, it is worth studying the 
demographic information first for both the government and the insurance companies, 
then developing the new variety of crop insurance products. Since the agricultural and 
economic development can be much different in different regions across China, by 
doing so, the insurance products will meet the actual demand of the farmers in that 
particular area, providing benefits to both farmers and insurance companies. 
Moreover, the preferential policy will not sleep in the governmental document, 
instead, it will truly promote the sustainable rural economic development and ensure 
the food safety for the nation. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1. Survey in the first experiment 
Number Category Question Unit Response 
A1 
Farm 
Characteristics 
Gender 0=Female, 1=Male 
 
A2 Age   
A3 
Including yourself how 
many people live in this 
house 
Number of people  
A4 
How many members of 
your household are 
primarily involved in 
agricultural work 
Number of people  
A5 
How many members of 
your household earn 
off-farm wages 
Number of people  
A6 
Are you the primary 
decision maker in 
agricultural affairs 
0=No, 1=Yes  
A7 
Do any household 
members work for 
village leader, village 
committee, state 
government, county 
government, state 
enterprise, and RCC or 
banks) 
0=No, 1=Yes  
A8 What is your education level 
0=Never Went to 
School, 1=At least 
elementary 
school, 2=At least 
middle school, 
3=At least high 
school, 4=Some 
University or 
college, 
5=Completed 
College or 
University 
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A9 How many years have you been farming 
  
A10 
What is the total size of 
your household farm 
(Mou, allocated Land 
Use rights, excluding 
land rented in) 
  
A11 
How much land do you 
rent in for agricultural 
use (total mou rented) 
Mu  
A12 
In general, how would 
you describe the current 
agricultural business in 
your area compared to 
last year 
1=Getting worse, 
2=About the 
same, 3=Getting 
better 
 
A13 
Please list the top five 
crops you have grown 
in the past 12 months 
from the most valuable 
to the least valuable 
1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
A14 Farm income Yuan  
A15 Off-farm income Yuan  
A16 Total income Yuan  
A17 Productive expenditure Yuan  
A18 
Household 
Consumption 
expenditures (food, 
clothes, health, 
education, etc) 
Yuan  
A19 
Other expenditures 
(e.g. car, house, 
vacation travel) 
Yuan  
A20 
Gross Incomes minus 
Expenditures 
  
Yuan  
B1 
Sources of 
Risk and Risk 
Perceptions 
Accepting greater 
production risks to 
increase the chance of 
higher profits is 
important to me 
1=Strongly 
Disagree, 
2=Moderately 
Disagree, 
3=Agree, 
4=Moderately 
Agree, 5=Strongly 
Agree 
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B2 
I am more likely to take 
risks with new 
agricultural 
technologies 
(mechanical or 
management practices 
or input use) before I 
see good results on 
other farms 
1=Strongly 
Disagree, 
2=Moderately 
Disagree, 
3=Agree, 
4=Moderately 
Agree, 5=Strongly 
Agree 
 
B3 
I am willing to take 
risks with new 
management practices 
before I see good 
results in other farms 
1=Strongly 
Disagree, 
2=Moderately 
Disagree, 
3=Agree, 
4=Moderately 
Agree, 5=Strongly 
Agree 
 
B4 
Diversifying my crop 
(including livestock) 
mix in order to reduce 
risk is important to me 
1=Strongly 
Disagree, 
2=Moderately 
Disagree, 
3=Agree, 
4=Moderately 
Agree, 5=Strongly 
Agree 
 
B5 
Having different Fields 
or farms at different 
locations (geographic 
diversification) is 
important to me 
1=Strongly 
Disagree, 
2=Moderately 
Disagree, 
3=Agree, 
4=Moderately 
Agree, 5=Strongly 
Agree 
 
B6 
I would consider 
growing more risky 
crops if I had (or have) 
greater access to 
irrigation 
1=Strongly 
Disagree, 
2=Moderately 
Disagree, 
3=Agree, 
4=Moderately 
Agree, 5=Strongly 
Agree 
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B7 
I would, or do, sell my 
agricultural products 
over a period of time 
rather than at harvest in 
order to reduce market 
price risk (diversified 
marketing) 
1=Strongly 
Disagree, 
2=Moderately 
Disagree, 
3=Agree, 
4=Moderately 
Agree, 5=Strongly 
Agree 
 
B8 
I have (or would if I 
could) made some non-
farm investments in 
new business, or 
financial assets like 
stocks and bonds in 
order to diversify 
household income. 
1=Strongly 
Disagree, 
2=Moderately 
Disagree, 
3=Agree, 
4=Moderately 
Agree, 5=Strongly 
Agree 
 
B9 
I am willing to 
ACCEPT more risk in 
all aspects of life 
relative to my peers 
(other farmers that you 
know) 
1=Strongly 
Disagree, 
2=Moderately 
Disagree, 
3=Agree, 
4=Moderately 
Agree, 5=Strongly 
Agree 
 
B10 
In general, I believe 
that I TAKE more risks 
in all aspects of life 
than my peers. 
1=Strongly 
Disagree, 
2=Moderately 
Disagree, 
3=Agree, 
4=Moderately 
Agree, 5=Strongly 
Agree 
 
C1 Precautionary Savings 
What proportion of 
Household income 
(define income here as 
revenues minus 
productive expenses 
minus consumption and 
other non-productive 
expenditures) are you 
able to save in a year 
1=none, 2=less 
than 5%, 3=3%-
5%, 4=more than 
10% 
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C2 I save in case my house needs repair 
1=Strongly 
Disagree, 
2=Moderately 
Disagree, 
3=Agree, 
4=Moderately 
Agree, 5=Strongly 
Agree 
 
C3 
I save in case my 
automobile (e.g. car, 
motorcycle, tractor) 
breaks down. 
1=Strongly 
Disagree, 
2=Moderately 
Disagree, 
3=Agree, 
4=Moderately 
Agree, 5=Strongly 
Agree 
 
C4 
I save in case I cannot 
repay a loan from 
earnings. 
1=Strongly 
Disagree, 
2=Moderately 
Disagree, 
3=Agree, 
4=Moderately 
Agree, 5=Strongly 
Agree 
 
C5 I save for unexpected medical emergency 
1=Strongly 
Disagree, 
2=Moderately 
Disagree, 
3=Agree, 
4=Moderately 
Agree, 5=Strongly 
Agree 
 
C6 I save in case I lose my job 
1=Strongly 
Disagree, 
2=Moderately 
Disagree, 
3=Agree, 
4=Moderately 
Agree, 5=Strongly 
Agree 
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C7 I save for unanticipated crop loss. 
1=Strongly 
Disagree, 
2=Moderately 
Disagree, 
3=Agree, 
4=Moderately 
Agree, 5=Strongly 
Agree 
 
C8  
In your opinion, do you 
think saving is 
important? 
1=Strongly 
unimportant, 
2=Moderately 
unimportant, 
3=important, 
4=Moderately 
important, 
5=Strongly 
important 
 
D1 
Predicted and 
Historical 
Yield 
If you grow rice,  corn 
or wheat, identify the 
lowest yield you 
believe possible, the 
yield that you believe is 
most likely to be 
received, and the 
highest possible yield 
you believe possible 
(Jin/Mu) where (1jin = 
500g) in the next crop 
year (2018/19) 
Corn 
 
 
 
 Wheat 
 
 
 
 Rice 
 
 
 
D2 
What is the percentage 
chance that your yields 
in the next crop year 
will fall outside the 
range of the Lowest and 
Highest values reported 
above 
  
  80 
D3 
What is the percentage 
chance that your yields 
in the next crop year 
will be at least as high 
as the most likely yield 
you reported above 
  
D4 
If you grow rice, corn 
or wheat, what is the 
lowest and highest 
yield (Jin/Mu) that you 
recall from your years 
in farming? If you do 
not recall exacts, please 
answer to nearest 
within 10 Jin/Mu. What 
is the average or most 
likely yield you have 
harvested 
Corn 
 
 
 
 
 
  Wheat 
 
 
 
 
 
  Rice 
 
 
 
 
 
E1 
Crop 
Insurance Use 
and 
Perceptions 
How much do you 
know about crop 
insurance 
1=I never heard of 
crop insurance, 
2=I know nothing 
about crop 
insurance, 3=I 
know a little about 
crop insurance, 
4=I know crop 
insurance well 
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E2 
Is crop insurance 
currently available to 
you (if Yes skip to E4) 
1=Yes, 2=No, 
3=Not sure  
E3 
If crop insurance was 
offered in your region 
next year do you think 
that you would 
purchase crop insurance 
(If Yes skip to E10; If 
No skip to E11) 
0=No, 1=Yes  
E4 
Have you purchased 
crop insurance (If No 
skip to E11) 
0=No, 1=Yes  
E5 
In what year did you 
first purchase crop 
insurance 
  
E6 
Whether the listed 
crops covered; How 
much do you pay per 
Mu; 
Have you ever received 
the indemnity 
Corn 
 
 
 
 Wheat 
 
 
 
 Rice 
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E7 
For most crops, crop 
insurance is subsidized 
by up to 80% of its fair 
value. For example, if 
you pay 3RMB/Mu the 
true cost would be 15 
RMB/Mu. Would you 
still purchase crop 
insurance if you had to 
pay 15 RMB/Mu, an 
increase of 5 times the 
current rate 
1=Definitely not 
purchase, 2=Will 
unlikely purchase, 
3= 
Will likely 
purchase, 4=Will 
definitely 
purchase 
 
E8 
(If definitely not or 
unlikely in E7) You 
responded that you are 
unlikely to purchase 
crop insurance if the 
price rose from 3RMB 
to 15RMB/Mu. Would 
you change your mind 
if you received a 50% 
subsidy so that the price 
was 7.5 RMB/Mu 
1=Definitely not 
purchase, 2=Will 
unlikely purchase, 
3= 
Will likely 
purchase, 4=Will 
definitely 
purchase 
 
E9 
If the cost of insurance 
remains the same as 
your last purchase, will 
you continue to 
purchase insurance for 
the next crop 
1=Definitely not 
purchase, 2=Will 
unlikely purchase, 
3= 
Will likely 
purchase, 4=Will 
definitely 
purchase 
 
E10 
Why do you purchase 
crop insurance? 
a. The insurance 
premium is affordable 
b. Crop yield in 
previous year was low 
c. The probability of 
future climatic risk 
occurrence is high 
d. Change in the local 
climate has caused 
damage to our crops 
1=Strongly 
Disagree, 
2=Moderately 
Disagree, 
3=Agree, 
4=Moderately 
Agree, 5=Strongly 
Agree 
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e. Government 
subsidizes the insurance 
premium 
f. My relatives or 
friends purchase crop 
insurance 
g. The richest person 
(or leader) in my 
village purchases crop 
insurance 
h. There are many 
propagandas in my 
village that encourages 
farmer to purchase crop 
insurance 
 
E11 
Why have not you or 
would not purchase 
crop insurance. 
a. I will not purchase 
crop insurance because 
I do not have enough 
money to pay for it 
b. I will not buy crop 
insurance because I do 
not believe that it is 
necessary 
c. I will not buy crop 
insurance because I 
don’t trust the insurer to 
compensate me if the 
insurance is triggered 
d. I will not buy crop 
insurance because I do 
not understand how 
crop insurance works 
e. I will not buy crop 
insurance because it is 
offered by a private 
insurance company and 
I would prefer to buy 
crop insurance from a 
government agency 
f. I will not buy crop 
insurance because the 
1=Strongly 
Disagree, 
2=Moderately 
Disagree, 
3=Agree, 
4=Moderately 
Agree, 5=Strongly 
Agree 
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payout if the insurance 
is triggered is too low 
E12 
If the frequency of 
disaster gets higher, 
would you be more 
willing to purchase a 
crop insurance 
1=Strongly 
Disagree, 
2=Moderately 
Disagree, 
3=Agree, 
4=Moderately 
Agree, 5=Strongly 
Agree 
 
E13 
If the premium per Mu 
gets lower, would you 
be more willing to 
purchase a crop 
insurance 
1=Strongly 
Disagree, 
2=Moderately 
Disagree, 
3=Agree, 
4=Moderately 
Agree, 5=Strongly 
Agree 
 
E14 
If the indemnity per Mu 
gets higher, would you 
be more willing to 
purchase a crop 
insurance 
1=Strongly 
Disagree, 
2=Moderately 
Disagree, 
3=Agree, 
4=Moderately 
Agree, 5=Strongly 
Agree 
 
E15 
If a crop insurance is 
provided by a state-
owned firm instead of a 
private one, would you 
be more willing to 
purchase it 
1=Strongly 
Disagree, 
2=Moderately 
Disagree, 
3=Agree, 
4=Moderately 
Agree, 5=Strongly 
Agree 
 
E16 
If a crop insurance is 
acceptable as loan 
collateral, would you be 
more willing to 
purchase a crop 
insurance 
1=Strongly 
Disagree, 
2=Moderately 
Disagree, 
3=Agree, 
4=Moderately 
Agree, 5=Strongly 
Agree 
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E17 
I believe that 
purchasing crop 
insurance will reduce 
my production risks 
which will better enable 
my ability to repay 
money I borrowed from 
banks, friends and/or 
relatives 
1=Strongly 
Disagree, 
2=Moderately 
Disagree, 
3=Agree, 
4=Moderately 
Agree, 5=Strongly 
Agree 
 
E18 
If I purchase crop 
insurance, it will 
increase my chances of 
obtaining a loan from a 
RCC or other formal 
bank 
1=Strongly 
Disagree, 
2=Moderately 
Disagree, 
3=Agree, 
4=Moderately 
Agree, 5=Strongly 
Agree 
 
E19 
I believe that by 
purchasing crop 
insurance I can increase 
the amount of money I 
can borrow from RCC 
or other formal banks 
1=Strongly 
Disagree, 
2=Moderately 
Disagree, 
3=Agree, 
4=Moderately 
Agree, 5=Strongly 
Agree 
 
E20 
I believe that crop 
insurance would 
become more important 
to me if I were to 
increase my farming 
operation by renting 
land (production rights) 
from a Land Transfer 
Center or from private 
individuals 
1=Strongly 
Disagree, 
2=Moderately 
Disagree, 
3=Agree, 
4=Moderately 
Agree, 5=Strongly 
Agree 
 
E21 
Have you ever 
purchased other types 
of insurance (for 
example, life insurance, 
fire insurance, 
automobile insurance) 
0=No, 1=Yes  
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F1 
Answered by 
interviewer 
only 
Do you think the 
respondent was 
engaged in this survey 
and answered truthfully 
all questions 
1=Strongly 
Disagree, 
2=Moderately 
Disagree, 
3=Agree, 
4=Moderately 
Agree, 5=Strongly 
Agree 
 
F2 
Do you think the 
quality of answers 
provided in this survey 
is adequate to include 
in any written reports 
1=Strongly 
Disagree, 
2=Moderately 
Disagree, 
3=Agree, 
4=Moderately 
Agree, 5=Strongly 
Agree 
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Appendix 2. Survey in the second experiment 
Number Question Unit Response 
A1 Gender 0=Female, 1=Male  
A2 Age   
A3 Including yourself how many people live in this house Number of people 
 
A4 Are you the primary decision maker in agricultural affairs 0=No, 1=Yes 
 
A5 What is your education level 
0=Never Went to 
School, 1=At least 
elementary school, 
2=At least middle 
school, 3=At least 
high school, 4=Some 
University or college, 
5=Completed College 
or University 
 
A6 How many years have you been farming 
  
A7 
What is the total size of your 
household farm (Mou, 
allocated Land Use rights, 
excluding land rented in) 
  
A8 
How much land do you rent 
in for agricultural use (total 
mou rented) 
Mu  
A9 Farm income Yuan  
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A10 Off-farm income Yuan  
A11 Total income Yuan  
A12 Productive expenditure Yuan  
A13 
Household Consumption 
expenditures (food, clothes, 
health, education, etc) 
Yuan  
A14 Gross Incomes minus Expenditures Yuan 
 
A15 How much do you know about crop insurance 
1=I never heard of 
crop insurance, 2=I 
know nothing about 
crop insurance, 3=I 
know a little about 
crop insurance, 4=I 
know crop insurance 
well  
 
A16 Is crop insurance currently available to you 0=No, 1=Yes 
 
A17 
If crop insurance was offered 
in your region next year do 
you think that you would 
purchase crop insurance 
0=No, 1=Yes  
A18 Have you purchased crop insurance 0=No, 1=Yes 
 
A19 
When you make purchase 
decision on crop insurance, 
rank the attributes matters to 
you from least important(1) 
to most(5) 
Frequency of disaster  
Crop premium  
Indemnity  
Type of insure 
(0=private, 
1=government) 
 
Collateral (0=not 
acceptable as loan 
collateral, 
1=acceptable) 
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A20 
Highest amount of money 
you would pay for a crop 
insurance  
Yuan/Mu/year  
B1 
Do you think the respondent 
was engaged in this survey 
and answered truthfully all 
questions 
1=Strongly Disagree, 
2=Moderately 
Disagree, 3=Agree, 
4=Moderately Agree, 
5=Strongly Agree 
 
B2 
Do you think the quality of 
answers provided in this 
survey is adequate to include 
in any written reports 
1=Strongly Disagree, 
2=Moderately 
Disagree, 3=Agree, 
4=Moderately Agree, 
5=Strongly Agree 
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Appendix 3. Descriptive data in the first experiment (1) 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
 Shandong Shaanxi Sichuan Total Shandong Shaanxi Sichuan Total 
Gender 0.609 0.690 0.580 0.627 0.491 0.465 0.496 0.485 
Age 56.536 59.070 57.000 57.545 11.399 10.389 12.056 11.317 
Total # households 3.814 4.670 4.540 4.347 1.616 1.985 1.755 1.826 
# in farm 1.866 2.130 2.210 2.071 0.772 1.405 1.113 1.135 
# outside farm 0.771 1.490 1.420 1.233 0.761 1.202 1.156 1.106 
Primary decision 0.814 0.770 0.768 0.784 0.391 0.423 0.424 0.412 
Work in govern 0.156 0.070 0.220 0.149 0.365 0.256 0.440 0.366 
Education 2.804 2.700 2.670 2.724 0.786 0.835 1.045 0.895 
Year of farming 32.691 39.980 36.301 36.361 13.372 12.992 17.205 14.901 
Farm ability 3.031 2.810 3.100 2.980 1.287 0.971 1.040 1.109 
Land contracting 7.011 4.493 4.473 5.303 5.750 2.797 3.798 4.418 
Land transfer 46.878 0.074 78.802 41.851 247.155 2.796 296.290 224.049 
Agribzness environ 1.680 1.640 1.940 1.754 0.715 0.811 0.694 0.751 
Agricultural income 101440.800 5694.845 188170.500 98394.790 573565.600 11748.080 667221.900 510918.200 
Nonagri income 31354.740 41191.140 54124.960 42407.830 35953.740 54948.470 114942.200 77236.900 
Total income 135841.900 41823.180 242365.100 140066.400 571935.600 36058.890 752093.900 549935.200 
Production cost 73703.570 2349.200 125517.700 67079.770 483211.000 4380.729 501674.600 402504.800 
Living cost 20181.040 16597.000 24131.800 20304.930 19034.180 15009.360 32433.990 23557.110 
Other cost 6103.864 3136.000 11302.000 6878.264 9335.606 3590.603 31418.030 19576.620 
Left income 34876.900 20308.420 87869.100 47678.860 92904.690 28573.780 243636.500 153791.800 
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Appendix 3. Descriptive data in the first experiment (2) 
 Min Max 
 Shandong Shaanxi Sichuan Total Shandong Shaanxi Sichuan Total 
Gender 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Age 23 25 27 23 76 81 82 82 
Total # households 1 1 1 1 10 10 9 10 
# in farm 0 0 0 0 4 10 6 10 
# outside farm 0 0 0 0 3 6 4 6 
Primary decision 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Work in govern 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 
Education 1 1 1 1 5 5 6 6 
Year of farming 0 3 3 0 58 65 69 69 
Farm ability 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 
Land contracting 0 0 0 0 40 12 22 40 
Land transfer -10 -8 -8 -10 2360 15 2000 2360 
Agribzness 
environ 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 
Agricultural 
income 0 0 0 0 5600000 91200 4100000 5600000 
Nonagri income 0 0 0 0 180000 470000 1053600 1053600 
Total income 3427.2 1600 1442 1442 5600000 214890 5153600 5600000 
Production cost 0 100 0 0 4700000 41560 3240000 4700000 
Living cost 3000 1000 200 200 120000 70000 200000 200000 
Other cost 0 0 0 0 70000 30000 300000 300000 
Left income -30000 -30500 -47000 -47000 850000 153790 1663600 1663600 
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Appendix 4. Quality of cluster analysis on the perception of risk in the first experiment 
 
Appendix 5. Quality of cluster analysis on the perception of precautionary savings in 
the first experiment 
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Appendix 6. Perception of crop insurance in the first experiment 
Shandong Frequency Premium Indemnity Insurer Collateral 
1 1% 1% 0% 2% 24% 
2 1% 4% 2% 3% 43% 
3 11% 19% 18% 9% 13% 
4 17% 17% 11% 13% 16% 
5 70% 59% 69% 73% 5% 
Average 4.531 4.292 4.469 4.510 2.354 
 
Shaanxi Frequency Premium Indemnity Insurer Collateral 
1 0% 1% 1% 1% 16% 
2 7% 12% 3% 8% 43% 
3 5% 7% 10% 9% 6% 
4 42% 34% 40% 40% 26% 
5 46% 46% 46% 42% 9% 
Average 4.270 4.126 4.270 4.140 2.690 
 
Sichuan Frequency Premium Indemnity Insurer Collateral 
1 4% 4% 2% 2% 23% 
2 8% 8% 10% 2% 33% 
3 8% 10% 9% 7% 5% 
4 36% 46% 40% 30% 31% 
5 44% 32% 39% 59% 8% 
Average 4.080 3  4.040 4.420 2.680 
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Appendix 7. Descriptive data in the second experiment (1) 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
 Henan Jiangsu Total Henan Jiangsu Total 
Gender 0.267 0.633 0.45 0.446 0.486 0.500 
Age 48.417 54 51.208 9.652 10.527 10.440 
Total # households 4.717 3.6 4.158 1.878 1.429 1.754 
Primary decision 0.533 0.667 0.6 0.503 0.475 0.492 
Education 2.75 2.883 2.817 0.836 1.136 0.996 
Year of farming 27.633 28.033 27.833 10.096 14.400 12.385 
Land contracting 7.503 9.393 8.448 6.295 4.800 5.654 
Land transfer 1.807 163.980 82.212 6.161 348.506 257.582 
Agricultural income 14525.44 389011.4 201768.4 13405.44 818678.9 606419.9 
Nonagri income 30173.73 50325 40334.03 23982.72 53130.02 42384.93 
Total income 53314.25 439336.4 249596.7 62215.54 810993.7 609190.3 
Production cost 7048 318462.5 162755.3 7537.802 648466.2 482663.4 
Living cost 22059 41712.1 31885.55 16093.43 26735.84 24086.98 
Left income 13528.91 79161.77 46901.55 22486.58 216525.7 158032.3 
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Appendix 7. Descriptive data in the second experiment (2) 
 Min Max 
 Henan Jiangsu Total Henan Jiangsu Total 
Gender 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Age 22 27 22 72 83 83 
Total # households 2 1 1 10 7 10 
Primary decision 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Education 1 1 1 5 5 5 
Year of farming 0 0 0 45 55 55 
Land contracting 0 0 0 45 27 45 
Land transfer -8.1 -12 -12 35.5 2000 2000 
Agricultural income 0 3000 0 80975 4836000 4836000 
Nonagri income 0 0 0 100000 206400 206400 
Total income 2000 7500 2000 480000 4886000 4886000 
Production cost 0 0 0 36300 3148000 3148000 
Living cost 250 4200 250 78000 110000 110000 
Left income -27100 -5000 -27100 98670 1668000 1668000 
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Appendix 7. Descriptive data in the second experiment (3) 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
 Henan Jiangsu Total Henan Jiangsu Total 
Heard insurance 2.085 2.750 2.420 0.596 0.836 0.797 
availability 0.967 0.967 0.967 0.181 0.181 0.180 
continuity 0.683 0.850 0.767 0.469 0.360 0.425 
Ever purchased 0.683 0.733 0.708 0.469 0.446 0.456 
Frequency 2.883 3.683 3.283 1.508 1.334 1.473 
Indemnity 2.967 3.183 3.075 0.991 1.033 1.014 
Premium 2.983 3.533 3.258 1.157 1.033 1.126 
Insurer 3.067 3.200 3.133 1.528 1.400 1.461 
Collateral 2.850 1.400 2.125 1.867 0.924 1.638 
Max WTP 18.140 22.590 20.422 10.533 16.836 14.238 
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Appendix 8. Willingness to pay under conditional logit model in two experiments 
 First experiment Second experiment 
 3 Provinces Shandong Shaanxi Sichuan 2 Provinces Jiangsu Henan 
 CL CL CL CL CL CL CL 
Frequency -5.522 -7.439 -1.985 -10.119 -5.762 -7.092 -4.476 
Indemnity 0.049 0.035 0.043 0.084 0.044 0.048 0.041 
Insurer 15.385 16.322 9.066 29.126 15.309 12.729 17.821 
Collateral 6.837 5.492 7.343 8.262 6.708 4.898 8.515 
 
Appendix 9. Willingness to pay under mixed logit model in two experiments 
 First experiment Second experiment 
 3 Provinces Shandong Shaanxi Sichuan 2 Provinces Jiangsu Henan 
 ML ML ML ML ML ML ML 
Frequency -5.847 -7.699 -1.981 -10.394 -6.393 -7.112 -4.528 
Indemnity 0.049 0.036 0.043 0.085 0.041 0.04 0.042 
Insurer 15.611 16.422 9.071 29.542 17.616 13.173 23.697 
Collateral 6.89 5.09 7.337 8.449 7.046 6.749 10.321 
 
